

published monthly since 1866

le

Fortnightly

FOUNDED IN 1865 BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

JULY, 1947

CMLXVII N.S.

CONTENTS

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA

SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON

NEW HONG KONG

JACK CHEN

THE AMERICAN NEGRO

J. E. MORPURGO

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (II)

W. W. ROSTOW

FOREIGN AFFAIRS :

THE GERMAN PROSPECT

W. T. WELLS, M.P.

HUNGARIAN ANVIL

WILLIAM RYDAL

RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS

F. ELWYN JONES, M.P.

THE MONNET PLAN AND ITS CHANCES

R. P. SCHWARZ

THE TEN-YEAR HOUSING PROGRAMME

GILBERT McALLISTER, M.P.

CLUBS IN BRITAIN

LORD ABERDARE

RELIGION IN EDUCATION

W. R. INGE

FORE BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND

RENE ELVIN

Correspondence—The Press in the Provinces

Illinois U Library

PRICE 3s. 6d. OR 75 CENTS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

42s. OR \$8.50 PER ANNUM

ALL CLASSES
OF INSURANCE •
TRANSACTION

MOTOR UNION
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
10, ST. JAMES'S STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

WHERE TO STAY

WELLINGTON HOTEL

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

Delightfully situated at the summit of the Common facing South. Private suites at moderate terms. Lock-up Garage. Passenger Lift. First - class management.

Hot and cold water and gas fires in bedrooms.

UNSURPASSED FOR SITUATION AND SERVICE

Telephone : 1150. Proprietors : Trust Houses Ltd.

KENSINGTON PALACE MANSIONS

DE VERE GARDENS, LONDON, W 8.

Single or Double Rooms; rooms with Private Bath; Private Suites. Restaurant.

TERMS : DAILY OR WEEKLY. TELEPHONE : WESTERN 8121

SOUTH DOWNS

Unusual comfort, delightful sunny location. Old-world charm. Farm and garden produce, varied and appetising meals (invariably warmly commended). Excellent golf, riding, fishing; lovely walks. 20 minutes sea, 1 hr. London; near station. Licensed.

CHEQUERS HOTEL, PULBOROUGH,
SUSSEX. TEL : 86.

BUDOCK VEAN

FOR BLUE SKIES BLUE WATERS, PEACE,
RELAXATION, GOLF, FISHING, SAILING,
AND LOVELY SANDY COVES

MANOR HOUSE HOTEL

BUDOCK VEAN, NR. FALMOUTH, S.W. CORNWALL

LLANGOLLEN. Hand Hotel. One of the best in N. Wales. H. & C. water all rooms. Facing River Dee, free fishing (trout). A.A. & R.A.C. Tel. 3207.

THE NORFOLK

Brighton's Premier Hotel - Facing the Sea

DINNER & DANCING EVERY EVENING TO
JEFFREY ESSEX & HIS ORCHESTRA

SPECIAL TERMS QUOTED ON APPLICATION MANAGER
NOVE 8201 GARAGE



A Green Field is Heaven

to poor mothers and children who live in the drab and dreary parts of our cities and towns and rarely get the chance of leaving such surroundings.

The Church Army is doing all it can to give as many as possible a much-needed rest and change in the country or by the sea.

It costs 30/- to provide a week for a mother and baby—£3 10s. for a mother and two children.

Your gift in support of Church Army Fresh Air Homes will be welcomed by Prebendary Hubert H. Treacher, General Secretary and Head

CHURCH ARMY
FIGHT THE GOOD FIGHT

55, Bryanston st., London, W.I.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

Published Monthly by The Fortnightly Review, Ltd., at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Sq., London, W.1.

JULY, 1947

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE DEFENCE OF INDIA. BY SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON	1
A NEW HONG KONG. BY JACK CHEN	9
THE AMERICAN NEGRO. BY J. E. MORPURGO	16
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (II). BY W. W. ROSTOW	25
FOREIGN AFFAIRS:	
THE GERMAN PROSPECT. BY W. T. WELLS, M.P.	32
HUNGARIAN ANVIL. BY WILLIAM RYDAL	34
RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS. BY F. ELWYN, JONES, M.P.	37

'To Asswage Raging Pains'



¶ Nowadays 'the raging pains of gout and sciatica' and all other rheumatic or nerve pains can be 'asswaged' safely and effectively in a few minutes — with 'Cogene'.

¶ 'Cogene' is not a single drug; it is a scientific combination in tablet form of four separate drugs, three of them pain relievers and the fourth a stimulant. It is one of the recent discoveries of medical science that a small quantity of a powerful drug will do the work of a large dose if it is backed by the right combination of other drugs in the right proportions. In 'Cogene' only a minute amount of each drug is present — thus avoiding any possibility of harmful after-effects — yet the scientific combination of all four is so

¶ "Take Aloes, Hermodactils and Scammony, of each half a dram; reduce them to subtil powder and make Pills thereof with Juice of Roses" runs an old seventeenth-century prescription "to asswage the raging pains of gout and sciatica".

effective that 'Cogene' will 'reach' even the most harassing nerve pain in a surprisingly short time.

¶ But — one word of warning — always remember that while 'Cogene' will relieve the pain, it cannot remove the *cause* of the pain: only a doctor or a dentist can do that. Supplies are limited, but your chemist will see you get *your* share. Price 1/1½d. a tube.

COGENE

Regd. Trade Mark

Brand Tablets

A 'GENATOSAN' Product

CONTENTS.—contd.

	PAGE
THE MONNET PLAN AND ITS CHANCES. BY R. P. SCHWARZ	40
THE TEN-YEAR HOUSING PROGRAMME. BY GILBERT MCALLISTER, M.P. ...	48
BOYS' CLUBS IN BRITAIN. BY LORD ABÈRDARE	56
RELIGION IN EDUCATION. BY W. R. INGE	61
THE PRESS IN THE PROVINCES— <i>Correspondence.</i> LEONARD FLETCHER, NEWSMAN ...	66

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY :

MORE BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND. By René Elvin	68
---	----

Other Contributors: *W. Friedmann, O. M. Green, Gordon Winter, The Rev. B. C. Plowright, C. Northcote Parkinson, J. F. Burnet, Herbert T. Banyard, Joseph Braddock, John Armitage.*

- ¶ While the Editor is glad to consider articles offered for publication, he cannot undertake to return MSS. unless accompanied by a stamped envelope.
- ¶ The Editorial, Advertising and General Business Offices of THE FORTNIGHTLY are at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Square, London, W.1.
- ¶ Entered as second-class matter, January 4, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1897 (Sec. 397 P.L. & R.).
- ¶ Registered for transmission by Canadian Magazine Post.



This world-famed Sherry (formerly called Findlater's Fino) could not be registered under that name and thereby protected from imitators. For the safeguarding therefore of our world-wide clientele we have renamed it—Findlater's Dry Fly Sherry.

FINDLATER MACKIE TODD & CO. LTD.

Wine & Spirit Merchants to H.M. the King.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JULY, 1947

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA

BY SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON

THE crisis in Indian politics that developed early last year compelled His Majesty's Government to intervene. A Cabinet Mission went to Delhi and evolved a scheme of compromise between the rival claimants to power. The British ministers declared roundly that Pakistan was a strategic impossibility; Indian unity, if only for military reasons, must be preserved. To induce the Muslims to agree to a union, a system of grouping the provinces was elaborated, which gave the Muslims a sphere of influence adequate, it was thought, to ensure them against Hindu predominance. Provincial parliaments would elect a Constitutional Assembly which in due course would frame a constitution for the Centre and the provinces. The Muslims with extreme reluctance agreed to give the scheme a trial; Congress, on the other hand, demurred to the grouping, especially of Assam. They were, however, finally induced to accept the proposed arrangement, but so obviously with mental reservations that the Muslims lost confidence and withdrew their acceptance of the Mission plan. Meanwhile, an interim government had been founded at the Centre, ostensibly a coalition of the League and Congress. The Constituent Assembly was duly elected by the provincial legislative assemblies; the Muslims refused to join. They re-asserted their claims to a separate State; there were violent outbreaks of communal strife in Bengal and Bihar, involving tragic loss of life. The trouble spread to the Punjab and the North West Frontier; the League was determined to oust the Congress government from the latter province as well as the unfriendly coalition government in the Punjab, where the League was the strongest party. The country was drifting into civil war; Congress were threatening to leave the interim government and to start an aggressive movement, unless the Leaguers were ejected from the Cabinet and control placed in Congress hands.

H.M. Government again felt it necessary to intervene. They took the extreme step of announcing, on February 20, that they would quit India by June 1948, handing over power to any government or governments that might meanwhile have been formed. The effect was electric. The League realized that it must make its position secure in the Punjab and the North West Frontier; it redoubled its agitation. The Punjab government collapsed; administration was taken over by the Governor. Thereupon, the Sikhs started a violent counter-movement which led to clashes with the Muslims who retaliated with appalling outrages in the north-western districts. The trouble spread later on to the south-west Punjab between the Muslim Meos of the Alwar State and the Hindu

peasantry of the adjacent British Indian districts in the neighbourhood of Delhi; the disturbances, in fact, fell little short of civil war.

The danger was more insistent on the North-West Frontier. The Congress government there headed by Dr. Khan Sahib, a local Pathan, was an anomaly. Ninety-five per cent. of the province is Muslim; most are Pathans who do not regard themselves as Indians. Congress, realizing that they could not hope to rule India unless they controlled the North-West Frontier bought their way into office there in 1937 at enormous expense. Khan Sahib and his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had built up a strong faction known as the Red Shirts, composed of a group of young Pathans opposed to the party of the Khans or big land-owners. Khan Sahib was in control of the government during the elections of the Spring of 1946, which placed him in a strong position against the League; this, with a lavish expenditure of money—each Pathan seat is said to have cost a lakh of rupees (£7,500)—and the support of the Sikhs and Hindus who, are heavily over-represented, enabled Khan Sahib to form the existing government. It is generally recognized that the League defeat was mainly due to bad leadership.

Competent observers assert that most of the Pathans are anti-Congress and for the League, and that a fresh election, held free from official influence, would give them an overwhelming majority, despite Dr. Khan Sahib's pledges to introduce socialism and to re-distribute the land of the province. For the League it is a matter of life and death to eject Congress from the Frontier. Pakistan could not exist with a hostile government on the opposite bank of the Indus, backed as it would be by a strong force of Hindus, Sikhs and Gurkhas at strategic points. Not unnaturally the League have been making desperate efforts to oust Khan Sahib and his Congress ministry. There have been demonstrations all over the province, leading in many cases to murderous outrages. The frontier towns of Tank and Oghi have been partially destroyed; so has Dera Ismail Khan. In some cases trans-border tribes have been involved; Wazir and Afridi *jirgahs* (tribal assemblies) have declared that they are opposed to Congress rule. Dr. Khan Sahib arrested his opponents by the thousand; the agitation still went on. The danger of an onrush of frontier tribes was increasing daily. Should this occur the Pathans, after overthrowing the Congress Government, might proclaim their independence or link themselves with Afghanistan, in which the province was, for over a century, included.

Neither H.M.'s Government nor political Hinduism could contemplate the loss to India of the Afghan borderland with equanimity. The Western Punjab, a part of Pakistan, would ally itself with the Afghans; if the Kabul government could hold its own, militant Islam would be a constant threat to Hindu India. There would however be little hope of a peaceful border under such conditions. The Kabul government finds it difficult to control its own tribes on its side of the Durand line; the added responsibility of dealing with their kinsmen on the British side would be beyond it. Dynastic troubles are always possible in

Kabul; the frontier tribes on the British side are only too ready to intervene. For example, a great *lashkar* of Wazirs from the British side of the line carried Nadir Shah some twenty years ago to the throne of Kabul. The Wazirs enjoyed the adventure and the loot it brought; they would not hesitate to repeat it if opportunity offered. In fact there have since been several attempts at king-making by tribes in the British sphere of influence, only kept back by heavy pressure from Delhi. With Delhi no longer in control there might be intrigues against the ruling dynasty leading to trouble, possibly giving an opening for Russian intervention.

That was one danger. There was another still more intense. Unless Hindus and Muslims could come to an understanding, civil war, on the departure of the British, would be a certainty. The border would be involved; could Russia stand aloof with the possibility of a flame of Muslim fanaticism spreading from Delhi, across the Middle East and perhaps to Egypt? Muslim tribes in the adjacent Russian provinces would inevitably be drawn in.

Russian intervention would not stop at the Frontier. India would be an easy prey. Only a third world war between Anglo-Saxon and Slav could hold her back.

The risk was obviously not worth taking. By this time leading Hindus had begun to realize the threat to their independence that might arise from widespread disturbances on the Afghan frontier. Could India, even with half a century's respite, defend herself against the Slav power of the North West? "Russia is knocking at our doors" exclaimed a prominent Congress leader a month or so ago. Might not history repeat itself in a terrific onslaught from Central Asia? Only by allying herself with the British Commonwealth could India find security against possible disaster. The political atmosphere was growing more favourable for a compromise. H.M.'s Government felt that the time had come for a fresh effort. The result is that the two great political parties have accepted the advice of the British Cabinet and agreed to form two Indias, both to be included at least for the time being as separate Dominions in the British Commonwealth.

Thus H.M.'s Government has been convinced that not only is Pakistan not strategically impossible but that it is a strategical necessity. Political Hinduism has at last grasped the unpleasant fact that independence is impossible for an undefended India. They must shelter themselves behind the British Commonwealth against storms that might develop on the North West Frontier, or for that matter in the North East. For might not a resuscitated China feel that its position would be immensely strengthened if it had a port on the Bay of Bengal? Rangoon would be a tempting prize. Would China stop there? It is believed that Assam and Burma are shown on Chinese military maps as part of China.

But India cannot have a Commonwealth guarantee unless she works up her own military potential. It seems unfortunately certain that Mr. Jinnah will

not agree to a Union army. The risk would be too great from his point of view if the army were organized on present lines, which distribute the Muslim element (about thirty per cent.) among the various units. A skilfully conceived *coup d'état* might in such conditions give political Hinduism complete control. The present War Minister, Sirdar Baldev Singh, a leading Sikh, endorses Mr. Jinnah's view.

The Indian Army has a splendid record, enhanced by its loyalty during the present events. Competent observers notice signs that the strain is becoming too severe to be resisted much longer. That the army will not retain its present morale when the British officer element disappears, goes without saying. The presence of British officers has inspired confidence in the rank and file that the claims and interests of everyone will be impartially considered. In a mixed regiment commanded, for example, by a Sikh and officered entirely by Indians, would Punjabi Musalmans feel that the C.O. would do them justice? In most cases one might say that such mistrust would be unjustified. It would nevertheless exist.

The problem of officering the new armies, Hindu and Muslim, will present many difficulties. There is a lack of senior officers. The quality of the new element varies greatly. Many of the Indian commissioned officers are first class; on the other hand a large proportion is second rate. A considerable number were absorbed in the technical services, the Army Service Corps, and Army Headquarters, and so did not undergo the test of the front line. It will take years before a reliable cadre of officers can be built up. In the interval if India remains in the Commonwealth there seems no reason why British officers should not be retained.

Meanwhile a quarter of a million or more troops remain to be demobilized, a difficult and dangerous problem, if power is to be handed over to Indians in the next few months, as envisaged in the offer of H.M. Government. Doubtless the matter has been considered. To digress a moment, it might be suggested that H.M. Government should, by some mark of favour, show its gratitude to the Indians who fought for their country and the empire during the war. The Indian soldier, the peasants who worked on roads, aerodromes and in factories making munitions, suffer from land hunger. Land is not available to any great extent in India; there are millions of acres overseas, in North Borneo, British Guiana, New Guinea, which could be developed by Indian settlers without prejudice to the handful of indigeneous folk domiciled there. Australia and India must, in their own interests, co-operate both in the economic and military spheres; an invitation from Australia to India to help develop New Guinea should have favourable reactions in India. An offer of the kind by H.M. Government in the other regions mentioned might help to restore confidence, goodwill and friendship between Indian and Briton.

The outstanding military problem for the Indian Dominions when formed is to ensure the security of the Afghan frontier. The naval forces of the

Commonwealth will protect the 4,000 miles of Indian coast line. The bulk of the Indian army is stationed along the thousand miles of Afghan borderland from the great military base of Quetta in Baluchistan to the Malakand on the Peshawar border. Half or more of the rest of the military forces of the country are located in the Punjab, in the near vicinity of the border. Apart from regular troops there are some 25,000 irregular corps, militias and constabulary, mostly Pathans, employed in the day to day protection of the frontier. The necessary finance is supplied by the Government of India, which also provides the funds required for maintaining relations with the tribes (pay of political officers, etc.) and to pay the allowances made to various tribal groups in return for specific services such as protecting the roads through their country.

The new Muslim State could hardly be expected to provide at its own cost for the defence of the Afghan borderland. Its financial resources would be inadequate; Hindu India would be in a perpetual state of anxiety if the Frontier were entirely in the hands of the Muslim League. The Hindustan government would not be prepared to help to finance the Muslim forces required, nor to subscribe to the expenses of tribal border administration, without some guarantee that the money would be spent in the interests of India generally.

The only solution the Hindus would be likely to accept is that responsibility should be shared between the two great parties. But this would only be possible with British co-operation. Could Britain be expected to play such a rôle?

Now it is practically certain that if Britain is to maintain her position in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean areas and in the South East Pacific, she must have a strong military base or bases in the best possible strategic position in those regions. Malaya and Kenya have been mentioned in this connection. Would such bases be adequate? After all, the most pressing danger is the North West Frontier. Why not grasp the nettle? If India fell into Russian hands there would be no hope of Britain retaining her position in the Indian Ocean and the South East Pacific. She would lose half her overseas trade; the standard of living of the British working classes would drop by half; Britain would become a third class power. Mr. Bevin undoubtedly had a possible disaster of this nature in mind when a month or so ago he insisted on the necessity of Britain maintaining her position in the Middle East if she wished to avoid economic troubles.

From the point of view of strategy it would seem that Quetta on the Baluchistan plateau is well worth considering as a British military base in the Indian Ocean area. It is not British India; the Hindu Congress has no claim to it; it belongs to the Khan of Kelat and is held on lease. It has an equable climate and is easily accessible from Karachi, a port which would fall within the Pakistan area; its use would be readily conceded to the British Government by the Muslim League. A more direct route from Karachi than at present could be obtained by constructing a railway through Las Bela in Kelat territory.

Baluchistan is a curious agglomeration of political entities. There is an area (about 40,000 square miles) which was ceded by treaty to the British; Agency territories under British control (not, by the way, British India) cover 43,455 square miles, inhabited by sparsely scattered semi-independent Afghan tribes (the Zhob and Loralai valleys); the rest, some 80,000 square miles, is the territory of the Khan of Kelat, much of it occupied by tribes standing in feudal relations with the Khan. The country is, for the most part, mountainous and arid; its total population barely exceeds a million. The Khan of Kelat acknowledges the paramountcy of the British Crown; paramountcy will disappear with the evacuation of India by the British; the Khan will be at liberty, theoretically at least, to make a new treaty with either or both of the new Dominions or to revert to the original position of his State as a feudatory of the Afghan King. He would unquestionably prefer to renew his treaty with the British Commonwealth and would doubtless include both Pakistan and Hindustan in the agreement.

The Muslim League, from what prominent members have told the present writer, would welcome British co-operation in Border defence. In point of fact, despite the feeling that Britain has let them down, members of the League have for a long time been ready to join the Commonwealth on the understanding that the Muslims got a fair deal in the Settlement of their territorial claims. Doubtless extreme supporters of the Congress would welcome a declaration by H.M. Government that they would not allow Dominion Status to the Muslims if Congress stood aside; that, however, is unlikely. It would mean of course that Britain could not share in the defence of the Afghan Frontier. To refuse to accept such responsibility would be unfair to the League and to the Middle East (almost entirely Muslim) generally. The Muslim world stood by the Allies during the war. Had they joined the Axis it might have meant disaster for the Allies. It would be a shame and disgrace to Britain if she refused to help to maintain peace on the Afghan frontier, the great barrier to Russian aggression. Should it collapse, this might mean, apart from the subjugation of India, the establishment of Russian rule over the Middle East generally. Congress could not impute a breach of faith to Britain should she join hands with the new Muslim State on the Afghan Frontier. Her troops in Baluchistan would not be stationed on Indian soil; in other military stations, the Khyber Pass, Razmak, for example, her troops would be in such places in agreement with the tribesmen who owe no allegiance to India apart from agreements with the British which lapse when the British retire.

It would be a simple matter to recruit Gurkhas from the independent State of Nepal for service on the North West Frontier. In fact the major portion of the British occupying forces could be of that composition. Their officers would be mainly British.

The prospect of the disappearance of the British from the Afghan frontier is causing much anxiety in Kabul. The military position of Britain in India

and on the Afghan frontier was a guarantee of peace in the Middle East, a barrier against possible aggression from the North. An alliance with an India that lacked the means of self-defence would be no substitute. Many Afghans indeed feel that if Britain goes from the Frontier they might well claim Afghanistan *irridenta* to the Indus. That would strengthen their military potential. They would undoubtedly welcome a plan of joint defence of the Frontier in which Britain continued to play a part. A strong progressive and self-reliant Afghanistan would be a stabilizing influence in the Middle East and on the North West Frontier. Such an improvement in status can only be achieved by the development of the economic resources of the country, especially the wealth that lies beyond the Hindu Kush. This is only possible with outside co-operation, especially in technique. Britain and India working in combination could do much to help. In point of fact it might be well worth while for India to give Afghanistan a loan for economic development.

The question of the relations of India with the border tribes between the Durand line (the political boundary between India and Afghanistan) and the administrative border can only be settled with British co-operation. These tribes can muster over a quarter of a million fighting men, mostly armed with modern rifles. Their country, as already noted, is not British India; they can and do claim an independent status, subject to the various agreements, tacit and otherwise, with the British Government. They have been told officially that their agreements cease to operate with the British withdrawal; that they will be at liberty to conclude fresh arrangements with the successor government or governments. Constitutionally they could revert to Afghanistan if they wished. They would almost certainly do so if the Hindu Congress tried to rule the Frontier. With Britain sharing in the defence of the borderland they would be prepared to carry on the existing arrangements. A joint commission composed of representatives of the three parties, Britain, Pakistan and Hindustan, might maintain relations with the tribes and assume responsibility for improving their economic position, the key to ultimate pacification. The cost of this and of the commission generally, as well as of the irregular military forces, should be borne in agreed shares by the Muslim and Hindu States, whether or not the Hindu Government accepts joint responsibility for defence. The amount fixed could, if necessary, be a charge on the customs.

For nearly a century and a half Britain has guaranteed the external and internal security of the Indian States. In return the Princes ceded territories which make up something like half of the British India now to be ruled by high caste Hindus, a privilege never enjoyed by their forbears in three thousand years of history. A further condition that the Princes would support the British Crown in the defence of India has always been loyally fulfilled. The guarantee disappears with the departure of the British. All that the Princes received in compensation is the abolition of paramountcy and the reversion of the rights and privileges conceded to the Crown. There is no question of the

return of the ceded territories. Faced by what might be a strong and hostile Hindu government the Princes would be in no position to re-assert the rights H.M. Government tells them they will recover. Their main interest in the future will be external defence. They would welcome the retention by Britain of responsibility to share in Frontier defence in which, if permitted, they would undoubtedly be prepared to play a part. The British guarantee of Frontier defence would be some return for the repudiation of the military protectorate over the States.

The defence of the North East Frontier might similarly be a joint responsibility of Britain and the two Indian Dominions. A small force of Gurkhas would be a sufficient contribution on the part of Britain. A joint commission could, at least for a term of years, maintain relations with the border tribes, such as the Nagas who fought valiantly for Britain in the world war. They would welcome an arrangement of the kind which would protect them against the exploitation to which they would otherwise be exposed. The adjacent tribes on the Burma side of the border might well be included in the scope of the commission. Britain is under a deep obligation to them. They have no affinities with Burmese nationalism and the Burmese have no valid claim to administer them.

So much for the defence of the Indian frontiers. The two Dominions could meet their liabilities with small but efficient and well-equipped military and air forces. To make rapid expansion possible in an emergency, they must build up heavy industries. The big Hindu industrialists who finance Congress have extensive plans with this end in view. The Muslims will doubtless operate on a smaller scale. Agrarian discontent is wide-spread, communism is infecting the countryside in many parts of India. Relieved of anxiety about Frontier defence, Congress politicians would be able to devote themselves to urgent measures of social and economic progress. As a member of the commonwealth, Hindu India could look to Britain and the Dominions generally for support and co-operation in improving the economic life of the country. Is it too much to hope that with British partnership in defence and co-operation in the economic field not only would happier relations develop between Britons and Indians, but also that the foundations of a lasting peace might be firmly laid in the Middle East and the S.E. Pacific, to the benefit not only of Britain and India but the world at large?

(Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., late Indian Political Department, has recently returned from a visit to India.)

A NEW HONG KONG

BY JACK CHEN

HONG KONG has made the biggest post-war rehabilitation progress of any place in the Far East between Ceylon and Tokyo. In the first weeks of 1947 it was handling seventy per cent. of its average pre-war volume of trade and the situation continues to improve. Though the Hong Kong dollar can now still only purchase as much as thirty cents did before the war, prices are decreasing steadily. From 769 points in January 1946 the price index is now down to around 500, though no one expects it to go all the way back to the 100 points of 1938.

This busy harbour, the busier streets and shops, smiling faces, a steady influx of Chinese seeking security from political persecution or economic pressure inside Kuomintang China, the opening of 500 textile factories, new buildings—these are facets of life in the most prosperous place on the China coast. In June last year there were few cars. Now new taxis and automobiles give an air of opulence even though one knows that several of them belong to commercial collaborators who are now venturing to display some of their ill-gotten gains.

Hong Kong's steady recovery is due to the natural resilience of the Chinese population and the efficiency, enthusiasm and hard work of its British civil servants. I heard nothing but praise for the early military government under Major-General Festing which did a fine job of cleaning up after the occupation. Such well tried measures as bulk buying and price control to eliminate the black market played a major part in getting things back to normal paths of development. But what I found most heartening for the future is the fresh approach by government to old problems, the rapid headway being made by government-fostered co-operatives and the direct and helpful interest being taken by the Colonial Office in London. Thus not only is rehabilitation being achieved but a complete transformation is foreshadowed for a colony that used to be notorious among the Chinese for its die-hard *taipans* and the snobbish imperialism of "the Peak".

Old Hong Kong was frankly run with the interests of the *taipans*—the big merchant houses—very much in the foreground. This was an early and "normal" characteristic of imperial colonial policy. Then the rich Chinese merchants won a larger say in affairs. Now the government is taking a direct, helpful interest in the problems of the common folk. Old Hong Kong administrators will naturally protest that Hong Kong has for years been one of the

best administered areas in China, where Chinese normally have had a better opportunity of making an adequate living than in most parts of China proper. This is so, but I am considering the development of Hong Kong now, not in comparison with the backward areas around it but from the point of view of what could and should be done by administrators who are pledged to the ideals of a Christian democracy and who are looking to the future. On this standard it must be admitted that old Hong Kong made a pretty poor showing. There were and are shocking differences in conditions of life for the dwellers on the Peak and in the slums at its feet.

Because of objective conditions progress has not been equally rapid in all spheres. The medical services were badly destroyed. It will take years to put them on the level of a really modern service, though few could have done more in so short a space of time than has Dr. Selwyn-Clarke, the energetic M.O. Education has done a fine job in getting over 98,000 children back into school out of a shifting school age population of around 150,000. But further advances are likely to be slower since the department is now up against the very stubborn problems of lack of buildings and teachers. The University buildings were almost wiped out. And of course commerce has made more rapid recovery than industry mainly because of the high cost and relatively low level of skill of industrial workers. These problems will be settled along more or less routine lines, but the approach to the problems of fishing and agriculture has been inspiringly new.

The fisherfolk and farmers form a big proportion of Hong Kong's 1,500,000 population. Their standard of life has been greatly improved by two big schemes of government-sponsored co-operative marketing. These are under the general direction of Dr. Herklots, a biologist of Hong Kong University and now head of the colony's Development Department. The 70,000 fisherfolk of the colony were formerly completely under the thumbs of the astute fish-dealers or *laans* who "squeezed" them unmercifully. Now a government market, in whose management the fishermen participate, collects, weighs, and sells their fish in open auction to registered retailers. All fish must be sold through the market. It is brought in by the fishermen themselves or for them by one of the ten official syndicates in the main fishing villages. The market and syndicates provide transport, advance low interest loans and sell necessities like ice, salt, flour, rice and tackle at little over cost price. The fishermen pay only six per cent. commission on sales to cover the whole cost of the organization. The fisherfolk are still notoriously spendthrift. There is a saying that when they sell their catch they think first, not of "what can I buy best for this money?" but, "how quick can I spend it?" A "returnable commission" of two per cent. has therefore been instituted to encourage habits of thrift. This is really a compulsory savings scheme. Every half year the fisherfolk receive their accumulated savings in a lump sum plus two per cent. interest. For the current four months period at the time of my visit a trawler was averaging 1,500 HK\$, and

a long liner 3,000 HK\$ in savings.

The market is modern and a model of cleanliness. Coolies here also benefit from the scheme (this will influence conditions of coolie labour under private contract at other wharves). They get 160 HK\$ a month with free meals, one day's holiday a week, a new year's bonus of two months pay and sick relief in case of illness. 273 people are employed and paid out of the proceeds of the scheme. In its first year of work the market handled fish worth 21,000,000 HK\$ (£1,312,500), earned 1,260,433 HK\$ commission and ended with a clear profit of 300,000 HK\$ which is being used to develop a banking scheme, a fish canner and smoking plant and a school which will train men who will eventually be able to take over and run the scheme on a completely voluntary co-operative basis.

With this encouragement, the fisher folk, who were among the most backward of Hong Kong's population, are already producing their own leaders. Every fishing village already has at least one co-operative marketing organization. Only the government-run syndicates and most efficient dealers can compete with these co-operatives. In a typical instance a fisherman, new to the scheme, marketed an equal amount of fish through a dealer and through a 'co-op'. Each lot of fish fetched the same price at the market the same day, but the 'co-op' was able to pay the fisherman an additional profit of 600 per cent.

In nearby Portuguese-controlled Macao the fish dealers take only six per cent. commission on sales, but they deduct over twenty per cent. of the weight of the fish in weighing! In Hong Kong now these rapacious middlemen have been virtually eliminated; the fisherfolk are gaining a new consciousness as an organized community. A real change for the better has been brought about in the lives of nearly 100,000 people.

The vegetable market *laans* were even more tight-fisted and unscrupulous than the fish *laans*. They considered a 400 per cent. profit was normal business. Father Ryan, a Catholic priest who has an intimate knowledge of Chinese affairs is the temporary civil servant charged with the difficult job of helping the farmers market their produce without the "aid" of the *laans*. The marketing scheme is similar to that for fisheries. All locally produced vegetables must now be marketed through the central government wholesale markets and the villages already have democratically elected representatives on co-operatives to bring their produce to market and supervise the weighing, auctioning and payment. The Agricultural Department now has officials living out in the villages and here too its plans are having an immediate beneficial effect on the lives of the colony's 120,000 farmers. By fostering co-operative enterprise, and making low interest loans available, the government is taking the first steps towards breaking the numbing power of the village gentry and elders, the *laans* and money lenders who squeezed interest rates of up to 100 per cent. per year from the poor farmers.

Conditions in the Hong Kong countryside (Kowloon and the New Terri-

tories) have not been very different from those just over the border inside China. The average holding is 3 mau per head, and the poor peasants are as a rule in debt due to the age-old disadvantageous conditions of rents, loans, and marketing. The government marketing scheme is the first big breach in this wall of backwardness. It is handling half a million dollars worth of vegetables a month at a commission of only eight per cent. It gives free transportation from any point in the colony. A visit to the excellently run market and the eagerly expressed approbation of the farmers leaves no doubt about the benefits the scheme has brought them. The market employs coolies to move baskets around and supplies baskets for a small fee. Tobacco dust fertilizer costs ten cents. a catty from the market. It costs eighty cents. a catty from the *laans*. Ammonia sulphate costs thirty-five cents. a catty. It used to cost two dollars. Peanut cake costs thirty-five cents. instead of sixty-five cents. on the black market. The 700 people of San Ha village market 7,000 piculs of vegetables a month through their own co-operative organization working through the market. Chung Mok-fo used to bring in his little load of vegetables to market in the old days, wasting much of his time on the journey. Now he markets for the whole village, elected to the post by the village elders with the approval of his neighbours. Fair market conditions have attracted Chinese sellers from over the border. Local tomato growers have established co-operative marketing for export; several whole villages have combined to sow new types of vegetable seeds as co-operative undertakings. Retail prices are agreed upon and published daily. Licensed buyers and hawkers are seeing that the moderate regular profits they can make on an organized market are preferable to speculative but uncertain profits. 5,000 middlemen including the sixty big *laans* who formerly monopolized the trade have been either eliminated or have taken a normal place in the scheme. The die-hards naturally make a considerable to do about the suppression of "private enterprise". But these two schemes and the developments they foreshadow are clearly a practical approach to the problems of the basic strata of Hong Kong's population.

This is of course only a start. Besides the 250,000 farmers and fishermen, there are the 300,000 industrial and handicraft workers and several thousand casual labourers and coolies. Their conditions of life—even those of the thirty per cent. who are skilled labourers, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Factory conditions are poor and with high prices for food (particularly rice) and rents they are having a hard time making both ends meet even though they receive a cost of living allowance which is fixed according to the current price index. Though rents are controlled there is a deal of key money being paid. It is notorious that the coolies along the Bund are shamefully exploited by the contractors and foremen. These abuses can of course be remedied only by government action plus the development of trade union organization. In Hong Kong there are eighty workers' organizations. But just as the co-operative

movement (which now includes the first artisan and consumer co-operatives) still lacks proper legislation, so there is still no such thing as a legal trade union with fully recognized rights in the colony. Nevertheless plans are afoot for the organization of a general association of trade associations and guilds, and with the appointment of a labour officer this situation should shortly be remedied. Labour circles have expressed considerable satisfaction at the official support given the schools for workers' dependents which were formally opened in March for 1,300 children.

It is a pity also that plans for political democratization of the colonial régime still hang fire. The government is thus depriving itself of important support for its long range plans of economic and social progress. Wider and more conscious support from the Chinese population would ease the position in regard to the recently introduced income tax and make it easier to raise funds for public housing and other public works. This is also of crucial importance for the future of Hong Kong. Good though administration is at present, it is still in the nature of paternalism, and it is clear that the people of Hong Kong will not be satisfied with paternalism. The peoples of the East have "grown up" and those of Hong Kong are no exception. The national ties between Hong Kong and motherland Chinese are very real. Hong Kong in the old days was regarded by the Chinese as a military-imperialist threat to the home country, as a relic of the hated Unequal Treaties. As such it was the target of the general strike of 1925. Though its significance has changed as a result of the transformation that has taken place in Britain's position in the East, it is certain that if Hong Kong is regarded as a colony in exclusive British possession it will inevitably become a source of discord in Anglo-Chinese relations.

The Chinese population plays a major part in the business and industrial life of the colony and an increasing part in administration. Here people of all parties enjoy a freedom denied them inside Kuomintang China. They take a realistic view of things. They know from close observation of neighbouring Canton how well off they are. No progressive group of Chinese in Hong Kong or China wants Hong Kong to be handed over to the Kuomintang as it is at present constituted. But every Chinese I have met wants Hong Kong to be returned to China at some stage when a united and democratic Chinese government can guarantee to the people of Hong Kong the same level of well-being and hope of progress that they now enjoy. In Chinese breasts the tide of nationalism runs strong. It will not be stemmed.

Some extremely conservative British opinion would like an unequivocal statement from the British government that Hong Kong will remain British. A writer in the *National Review* even wants restrictions placed on Chinese immigration. Nothing would be more harmful at this stage. On the other hand there are those ultra-lefts who want Hong Kong to be "scuttled" right away and "not waste money on it". These are short-sighted views. Both

tacitly admit an uncompromising state of feud between Chinese democratic nationalism and British interests in the East. This is by no means an inevitable state of affairs.

Some leading British officials express the hope that Hong Kong can be developed into such a model community that no Chinese will want its status changed. This is a courageous view, but I think it is a counsel of perfection. I am more optimistic about the future of China than such a view implies. Given sound democratic administration I believe that China can and will emerge as the leading Far Eastern power within the next twenty years or sooner. In that event its attraction for the people of Hong Kong—who alone can be the judges of their fate—will be irresistible. At some stage then, and not necessarily at the end of this process, the question of Hong Kong's future will certainly be tabled. If a renascent democratic China, freed of the pernicious control of the Kuomintang right wing, is opposed by a hostile and inflexible Hong Kong policy in Britain, there is no doubt that an explosive situation will develop.

What policy then will best protect and further true British interests in this area? It must first be recognized that Hong Kong's essential importance in the new era is as a means of trade with China. It is a convenient trading post. It enjoys a good port, law and order. (The present military forces there cannot be regarded as a threat to Chinese sovereignty. They are needed to prevent depredations by the extremely active and well organized gangs of smugglers and pirates which flourish in these areas. They are also a reserve for the fulfilment of Britain's commitments as an Allied occupation power in Japan.) Hong Kong is a source of profit and well-being to the large and predominant Chinese population as well as the British firms there. In 1946, China's only active trade balance was with Hong Kong. Though there may be die-hards who wish to make it so again, Hong Kong has lost its significance as an advanced base of British imperialism. It is a point of commercial and cultural contact between British and Chinese. If the problem of Hong Kong is approached from this angle then it ceases to be a problem. There is no room then for a policy of exclusive imperial preference. But recent events in Shanghai or Taiwan (Formosa) indicate what would result if the present Kuomintang régime were to take over in Hong Kong. The development of Hong Kong by Britain in this interim period cannot then be regarded as merely feeding a gift horse for China. It is an investment in future British-Chinese co-operation that will pay worthwhile dividends.

This policy of course only makes sense if it is accompanied by an enlightened effort to bring about the extension of democratic responsibility and consciousness among the Chinese inside Hong Kong. It is clear that the hopes placed in a few rich Chinese merchants (whose position in fact was somewhat analogous to that of collaborationists with British imperialism) were unfounded. These men proved just as ready to collaborate with the Japanese when the time

came. (Though in their defence it must be recorded that they insist that they were only carrying out the instructions given by the pre-occupation British authorities.) Sympathy for Britain must be put on a wider basis than that. Anyway these props of the old Hong Kong have entirely lost "face" among their compatriots though they still sit on government committees. It is in such schemes as those for the fishermen and farmers, in its new Trade Union policy, in its plans for an extension of real democratic participation in government by the Chinese population, in a development of its university and cultural possibilities that Britain must place her hopes of the future in Hong Kong.

There must be a consistent approach in all aspects of policy. There must be an end of all aspects of racial discrimination, as for instance in matters of pay or social intercourse. While it is understood that critics of the Kuomintang who have found shelter in Hong Kong must keep within the law so far as their criticism of the Kuomintang or indeed of any friendly government is concerned, a firm stand should be taken against the Kuomintang intrigues and attempts at terrorism against non-Kuomintang elements in Hong Kong. It is well known for instance that the official headquarters of the Kuomintang in Hong Kong maintains special agents who spy and have attempted to intimidate people suspected of being either anti-Kuomintang or "too pro-British". There is no necessity to "appease" the chauvinists of the Kuomintang who are agitating against Hong Kong now. The days of their dominance in Chinese affairs are ending.

If consistency is brought into all departments of policy and the local Chinese are effectively mobilized in support of progressive plans, Hong Kong can be turned into a permanent Sino-British co-operative trading centre no matter what its legal status is in the future. Policy for Hong Kong must be placed in the context of a forward looking policy towards China as a whole based, as in Hong Kong, on collaboration with the democratic elements of unity and enlightened nationalism.

In that context, the granting of aviation privileges, the use of port and dock facilities, adequate compensation to any British enterprises that suffer through a change of sovereignty—these are purely technical problems that present little actual difficulty.

(Mr. Chen, the son of a former foreign minister of China, has just returned from a four months visit to China and Hong Kong.)

THE AMERICAN NEGRO

By J. E. MORPURGO

THE realization of the evils of race antagonism is immediate to any visitor to the United States. The existence of a problem is not potent in an Englishman's mind until he has assimilated sufficiently the atmosphere of America so that he can appreciate America's difficulties.

England has been subjected to a long indoctrination to the theories of liberty. In principle, the Negro stands equal before the law. "*Quamvis ille niger, quamvis tu candidus esses*", though he be black, though you be white. Lord Mansfield's sturdy decision of 1777, "the air of England has long been too pure for a slave, and every man is free who breathes it", has won the sentiment of the nation. Re-assured by Harriet Beecher Stowe's propagandist flattery—"the Union Jack—symbol of liberty"—Englishmen have accepted the ideal as a national virtue, at least where English-speaking Negroes are concerned, and are, in consequence, slow to grasp the bitter truth that the "Negro problem" is a white man's problem. The Negro cannot solve it, the Southerner cannot solve it; it is not even limited in its implications to the boundaries of the United States. If we, in England, can criticize the American for anti-black discrimination, it is because the small numbers of Negroes in this country create for us a problem that is hardly more than academic. Our instincts are little different from the instincts that have occasioned America's outstanding and permanent failure, and the vital obstacle to solution, the barrier against miscegenation, has been constructed by instinctive white prejudice.

Over-explanation has resolved America's problem into two principal factors: the difficulty of race assimilation, and economic competition. But, though both are stupefying and seemingly insuperable embarrassments, the factor that is eternally damning is an inhibited distaste among the whites for close association with Negroes. Implicit to this distaste is the objection to miscegenation.

All other races save the Oriental and the Negro have been assimilated into the American "race". Even the Indian has had to be artificially preserved from submersion. But the Negro cannot become an American in the full sense. The reasons, sunk as they are in the morass of innate psychological reaction, are beyond analysis. Despite his repugnance for friendships and for marriage, the white male has no objection to having sex-relations with black women. In fact, in many countries with mixed populations, coloured women are looked upon as particularly desirable and their erotic skill is emphasized

with salacious eagerness in conversation and anecdote in many clubs, bars and common-rooms. In the Southern States the illicit but ever-current definition of a "Southern gentleman" is a man who has had sex-relations with a Negress.

Beyond the limits of ordinary moral conscience a white man feels no particular shame in admitting that he has slept with a black woman, but if a white woman, from love, passion or financial need, associates with a black man, she will be socially ostracized and he may be lynched.

Although some Negro leaders, hurt and angry with white insistence, have supported white prejudice and encouraged their own race to reject the possibility of intermarriage, to the Negro the most immediate problems are economic, political and, in a legislative sense, social. He has no implied objection to miscegenation, and, his deep conviction of his own Americanism makes him eager for the overthrow of inter-racial inhibitions.

The white conscience is troubled, but even in the boldest personality conscience cannot overcome instinct.

The division between Negro and white has been exaggerated by tradition. Negro savagery, the myth on which white lynch-law lays its foundations, was a dangerous certainty already in the eighteenth century and both sides in the American Revolutionary War imputed the use of Negroes to their opponents, with that same air of horror that we to-day might use if our enemies practised bacteriological warfare.

The Tory sneered at Washington's army :

The rebell clowns, oh! What a sight
Too awkward was their figure
'Twas yonder stood a pious wight
And here and there a nigger.

and the American retaliated by coupling Negroes with the most hated man in Revolutionary America, Benedict Arnold :

Then in this class of Britain's heroes
The Tories, savage Indians, negroes
Recorded, Arnold's name shall stand.

Godwin in *St. Leon* gave the Negro a Gothic unreality as a great untamed child of nature but the eighteenth century already knew the patronizing certainty of white superiority and had become convinced that if the Negro had qualities to compensate for his savagery, they were the qualities of humility, fidelity and cheerfulness. When, in 1781, *Robinson Crusoe* was first dramatized and staged in London, Man Friday was played as an American Negro, and the paradoxes of his character : naïveté and native intelligence, servitude and fidelity, cheerfulness and brutality are as much a twentieth century conception of the black as an eighteenth.

The unauthentic and erratic genius of Stephen Foster, a man from Pittsburgh who knew a good tune but hardly knew a Negro, the muddled polemics and over-drawn sentimentalizing of Mrs. Beecher Stowe, and the fruity cheerfulness

of Hollywood have combined to keep the fallacies alive. Christy's Minstrels, and even such an exquisite novelist as Ellen Glasgow, have added to the tradition. Skilled, and coloured, interpretive artists like Hattie McDaniel and Bill Robinson have given the whites more evidence for their traditional beliefs by playing the Negro in the style which the white man expects, and many modern American coloured poets seem unable to shake off the emphasis on cheerfulness, and implied inferiority. John Holloway's "Black Mammies" for example, has the same falseness and banality as a cork-blackened minstrel show :

But she trusted in de shadder, an' she trusted in de shine
 An' she longed fo' one possession, dat heaben to be mine
 An' she prayed huh chil-en freedom, but she won herself de peace
 Peace on art' amids' huh sorrows, an' up yonder heavenly res'.

The cult has convinced many Negroes. Jerry in Chesnutt's *The Marrow of Tradition*, who tried to straighten his hair and to blanch his skin with lotions, has his imitators. There are still Negroes who can say with him "I'm gwine ter keep my mout' shet an' stan' in wid de Angry-Saxon race—ez dey call deyselves nowadays—an' keep de right side er my bread an' meat. W'at nigger ever give me twenty cents in all my bawn days?" Even among intellectual and professional Negroes I was always struck by their childlike acceptance of the theory of white superiority, and the aristocracy of black America itself is recognized by the Negro rather from the comparative paleness of his skin than from his moral or professional qualities.

But white America is waking to the certainty of its own failure. The old traditions are no longer conscience-salving. It is no longer enough to plead white superiority; no longer enough to blame the South alone; for the modern South is more tolerant though less understanding of the Negro than the South of seventy years ago. There is hardly an American who has no opinion of the Negro problem, and there are few intelligent Americans, even in the South, who do not feel that theirs is the guilt of race discrimination.

Personal relations between Negro and white were probably happier on a good plantation in the Old South than they are to-day in New England or New York. The relationship was simple and sentimental. The qualms of the white slave owner could be easily quietened by the realization that he treated his slaves with kindness. Like Patrick Henry he could pay devoir to virtue and lament his want of conformity to her precepts. Even in self-accusation there was always a compensatory breath of self-praise. The Negro, on a good plantation, was well-fed, well-housed and economically safe.

To-day the Negro struggles alone. Technological progress has made his unskilled labour unmarketable. He is free—to starve, but not free to be educated. He is an expatriate living in his home country, an American without America.

A few Negroes feel that improvement may come, through love or through

violence :

I am the darker brother
They send me to eat in the kitchen
When company comes,
Tomorrow,

I'll sit at the table
When company comes.
Nobody'll dare
Say to me
' Eat in the kitchen '
Then

Besides
They'll see how beautiful I am
And be ashamed.—

I, too, am America.

But the white American knows that he must solve the problem and will not; should and cannot. He has no love and he will not accept intimidation. Bewildered he hides his confusion in legislation that cannot be enforced, and flatters his conscience with facile apologetics. After all, he claims, the black is better off in America than he would have been in the jungles of Africa.

There are many and excellent books on America's race question. Much can be learnt from the conduct of white Americans and much from a study of the pathetically brave efforts made by Negroes to maintain their racial dignity—students at Hampton Institute trying, under a White President, to build an aristocracy of learning and an aristocracy of labour . . . a Negro doctor closing his conversation just before the train reaches Washington though he knows that you are travelling to the same town in Virginia, for South of Washington you are over the Mason-Dixon Line and there are Jim Crow cars on the trains . . . Marion Anderson singing in the open to an enormous crowd, white and black, who feel with her for the insult she has suffered in being refused the use of the hall owned by the Daughters of the American Revolution. But the observer who wishes to grasp something of the state of mind of the American Negro can learn more from Negro poetry than from any sociological analysis or personal investigation.

The Negro achievement in poetry is not all polemic. Lynch-law, intellectual frustration and race antagonism overshadow their work, but technical and artistic virtuosity is more apparent in the small group of Negro poets than in any group of a similar size in modern poetry in English. The black writer suffers the disadvantage of his race in all the professions, and, if he is to survive, he must be a poet of extraordinary determination and extraordinary skill.

Intellectually he may cry his equality and may refuse to be considered as an exception—a poet who happens to be also coloured, but race consciousness and

feeling cannot be taken from his inspiration. He is a black man who happens to be a poet, and as a poet he must proclaim his troubled mind. "Uncle Tom is dead" is the frequent stated boast of the Negro intellectual, who wishes to outlive and live down the toleration, that his race has shown to the Negro who "knew his place".

'White folks is white', says Uncle Jim
'A platitude', I sneer;
And then I tell him so is milk
An the froth upon his beer

but, however strong his desire, the Negro cannot change the colour of his skin, and its bruised blackness is mirrored in his poetry.

A few extremists have, with considerable skill, turned ostrich to the question of race, and have written as conventional or unconventional poets whose exposition was the expression of beauty. Uncle Tom would have made nothing of William Braithwaite's polished English verse, and the Hollywood red-cap would lose his grin in perplexity had he been faced with Braithwaite's immaculate Shakespearean scholarship. No critic can find racial symptoms in the Sorbonne-trained accents of Jessie Fausset's translations and even the most consistent propagandists, and the best poets, among Negro writers, turn sometimes from their bitterness to strike the more normal notes of English verse. James Weldon Johnson, for example, long the Negro laureate, has written poems conventionally inspired and conventionally executed:

The glory of the day was in her face,
The beauty of the night was in her eyes.
And over all her loveliness, the grace
Of morning blushing in the early skies.

Countee Cullen renders homage to Keats

Folks seeing me must think it strange
That merely spring should so derange
My mind. They do not know that you,
John Keats, keep revel with me too

without proclaiming his race, and Sterling Brown's "Effie", though there is some desperation and some gaiety in her easiness, might have been any prostitute of any race.

Dialect is almost dead. For me only Paul Dunbar, the first Negro poet to win international recognition, could confirm my ninepenny-seat image of Negro accents, and though Johnson and Sterling Brown occasionally play upon the limited instrument of Negro dialect, with its two strings, comedy and pathos, "poets are seeking to find a form that will express the racial spirit by symbols from within rather than by symbols from without."

Two major conflicts perplex the Negro's mind and make his poetry. He is a patriot who is the victim of the country he loves and a religious being damned by his God. Africa is only a memory of the blood:

What is Africa to me;
 Copper sun or scarlet sea
 Jungle star or jungle track
 Strong bronzed men, or regal black
 Women from whose loins I sprang
 When the birds of Eden sang?
 (One three centuries removed
 From the scenes his fathers loved,
 Spicy grove, cinnamon tree,
 What is Africa to me?)

America is in the mind and the heart and yet—"America never was America to me."

He is a Christian but Christ was a Jew, and though the Jews have suffered they have been accepted. What could a Jew know of a black man's torment?

Way down South in Dixie
 (Bruised body high in air)
 I asked the white Lord Jesus
 What was the use of prayer.

Some Negro intellectuals, sceptical of the possibility of solving the problems of their race within the ideological organization of the United States, have sought elsewhere for curative philosophies. No change of party majority in America, no replacement of Democrat by Republican will improve the hideous lot of the black man. America, they argue, will always be a white man's country. Communism is the obvious refuge to which Negro intellectuals fly, for with Communism there can be no Jim Crow, and in Communism might lie the solution of the economic problems of the black race.

Stalingrad—
 Never Paradise—
 Just a city on the Volga
 Trying peacefully to grow,
 A city where some few small dreams
 Men dreamt came true.
 A simple city
 Where all worked, all ate
 All children went to school.
 No beggars,
 No sick without attention,
 No prostitutes,
 For women had jobs
 And men had wives
 People respected each other's lives.
 Communal brotherhood,
 A city growing toward the good.
 Stalingrad—not Paradise—
 Yet not bad.

The Negro poet stands back, and with just pride, claims the nationality of poetry. His race does not matter, nor his country; what are important are his

belief and his craftsmanship; his inner being and its outward expression. He is a poet and a believer in equality, not a black American.

It is easy to force explanation upon criticism and to analyse poetry to such refinement that the poetry disappears and the poet's hot intention is doused, left cold, logical and unrecognizable even to the poet himself. Yet in Langston Hughes's "Stalingrad" as in many seemingly unracial poems by coloured poets, there is an insistent proclamation of the poet's race.

The problems that Stalingrad has overcome (in Hughes's opinion) are those very problems that beset the Negro in America. "All worked and all ate"; obviously technical progress had not driven the unskilled labourer to unemployment. "People respect each other's lives"—no lynchings. "No prostitutes"—the easy way of a white man with a black girl is anathema to coloured leaders. "Communal brotherhood"—that is the Negro's dream.

Seeing such adulation, struck uncritical by distance, casual white observers have imagined that the Negro forms an ever-present Bolshevik cell and creates an imminent threat of Communist insurrection in the United States. His unsatisfied needs are sharpening his capacity for political activity and economic revolution is preached by many Negro thinkers, but the most stimulating and extraordinary quality of the Negro conscience is its patriotism. Despite his bitterness and desperation, the Negro is a good American convinced, with his white countrymen, that America is "the cradle of liberty", "the home of democracy" and "the land of opportunity."

Though "Stalingrad" is a eulogy of Russia, even though Langston Hughes may be a Communist himself, his near-paradise is full of strangely American symbols and it seems that, if he had his ambition, Communism would be imported into America and reorganized by free enterprise. Comrade Babbitt would join the Elks and the Volga would flow alongside Main Street.

America is an ideal, a dream, but the dream and the ideal are shared by Negroes.

A long time ago, but not too long ago, a man said
 ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL . . . ENDOWED
 BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE
 RIGHTS . . . AMONG THESE LIFE LIBERTY
 AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS.

His name was Jefferson. There were slaves then,
 But in their hearts the slaves believed him too.
 And silently took for granted that what he said was meant for them . . .
 ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL.
 NO MAN IS GOOD ENOUGH TO GOVERN ANOTHER MAN
 WITHOUT MAN'S CONSENT.
 BETTER TO DIE FREE THAN TO LIVE SLAVES.

Who said these things? Americans!
 Who own these words? America
 Who is America? You, me
 We are America.

These proud and determined words were written by a Negro, that same rebel who pledged Stalingrad, the rebel Langston Hughes.

The sacrifices of two wars have made Negroes more conscious of their Americanism, more disappointed and yet more proud. Stories may pass from black to black of the Negro soldier who announced his epitaph as "here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man in defence of a white man" and a few Negro veterans may voice their longing for the comparative equality of Great Britain, but Negro indignation was loudest when their race was refused the right to fight. All black America applauded Wendell Willkie when he complained that "when we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear they can no longer be ignored", but Willkie was an American criticizing America, and their applause is American applause for an American criticism.

Religion is not as comforting to the modern Negro as it was to his father. The sensual primitive faith of the spirituals does not hold the new intellectualized, politically-conscious Negro, but Christ's most appealing virtue was forbearance and forbearance is a quality that Negroes share and admire.

These truly are the Brave
 These men who cast aside
 Old memories, to walk the blood-stained pave
 Of sacrifice, joining the solemn tide
 That moves away, to suffer and to die
 For Freedom—when their own is yet denied.

And as the Crucifixion was the dramatic crisis of Christianity so is lynching the dramatic crisis of the black struggle for equality.

The analogy of the sacrifice is obvious to the Negro mind and repetitive in Negro poetry. Each movement in the Passion has its parallel, each even its echo: "Why what evil has this man done? I have found no cause of death in him . . . But they were instant with loud voices, asking that he might be crucified."—"Did this man sin? Nay but some one told how some one said another did." There is the accusation: "We found this fellow perverting the nation." There the torturers "plating a crown of thorns, scourging him and striking him."

Quick! Chain him to that oak! It will resist
 The fire much longer than this slender pine
 Now bring the fuel! Pile it round him! Wait!
 Pile not so fast! Or we shall lose
 The agony and terror in his face.

There the mockers who "spit upon Jesus, bowed the knee before him and mocked him":

And little lads, lynchers that were to be
 Danced round the dreadful thing in fiendish glee

and there the hideous realization, "all the people that came together to that sight, beholding the things which were done, smote their breasts and re-

turned":

There was a design of white bones slumbering forgottenly upon a cushion of
ashes

There was a charred stump of a sapling pointing a blunt finger accusingly at
the sky

* * * * *

Scattered traces of tar, restless arrays of feathers, and the lingering smell of
gasoline

And through the morning air the sun poured yellow surprise into the eye
sockets of a stony skull.

There was but one Crucifixion; the black has known many Calvaries, and many sensitive Negroes feel that their race has overplayed its faithful imitation of Christ. They would not pray for the forgiveness of their enemies.

Yet the Negro is emotional as a black and sentimental as an American. He must have patriotism. Both Christianity and Americanism are optimistic ideologies; the one preaches equality of heavenly promise, the other equality of earthly opportunity. The deprived Negro clings to his optimism, for optimism is his life.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (II)

By W. W. ROSTOW

AMERICAN post-war foreign policy has been formed around two factors central to the world scene: the new weapons, capable of threatening the United States, from distant interior air bases; and the diplomacy of the Soviet Union, which has appeared capable, under certain circumstances, of bringing the bulk of the Eurasian Continent under unified economic and political, if not military control. The problem of American foreign policy has consisted, at its base, in meeting the Soviet challenge in a manner compatible with the development of a well organized and stable framework of world peace.

Against this background four particular strands of policy can be distinguished:

1. The prevention of the use of military power by any country outside the terms of international agreements. This is the over-riding consideration for the American position in the Security Council.
2. The pursuit of settlements which would diminish the rôle of military strength in the world, and which would minimize the possibilities of its employment. This objective has, of course, governed the American position in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.
3. The pursuit of settlements of particular diplomatic issues throughout the world which promise local or regional stability, which do not threaten to create control of the Eurasian continent by a single power, and which are consistent with the successful evolution of the United Nations. A balancing of these criteria has been required on many issues, but notably in the formulation of policy designed to achieve unity in Germany and China.
4. The taking of such actions as are compatible with international agreements which encourage the maintenance and extension of political and economic practices abroad most congenial to American conceptions, and thus sustain an international environment in which those conceptions are likely to survive at home. A great deal of American trade and loan policy has had this ultimate rationale, as well as the measures taken to strengthen the military power of the Greek and Turkish governments. Mr. Marshall's recent statement at Harvard represents the highest expression of this branch of policy.

No responsible element in American public life would, I suspect, deny that

each of these strands has a place in American foreign policy at the present time. Debate centres rather on the relative energy and emphasis to be devoted to each, and to the aptness of particular formulations within them.

A first and prior judgment required was whether Soviet activities justified immediate declaration of war by the United States. Apart from its political impossibility, the facts, soberly weighed, have justified no such action.

The second judgment required, and one which is still under debate, concerns what might be called the issue of regional unity or schism. It arises from a pervasive paradox in the post-war position. I shall discuss this issue mainly in the context of Europe, but it obviously relates as well to the Middle East and to the Far East.

The great post-war diplomatic conception, based on the military Grand Alliance, was that upon all major issues of common concern Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States would seek agreement by consultation; and that the post-war world and the United Nations would be shaped about this hard core of unified Big Three policy. On the other hand, the war ended with the armies disposed in a very particular way; and even before the end of the war agreements had been reached which allotted the zones of occupation throughout the world largely on the basis of the expected position of the armies. Within the zones of occupation there was and there is a very strong tendency to proceed simply with policies of national advantage; but in all such areas at least formal and verbal acknowledgment has been made of the legitimate concern of all the major powers. This applies, of course, not only to areas literally occupied but also to such special cases as Poland and, in a sense, China. It applies to the older spheres of influence as well as to those created by the war or re-allotted upon German and Japanese defeat.

Nowhere was this paradox more evident, or more important, than in the Potsdam Agreement as it concerned Germany. The early portions of that document, relating to general economic and political policy objectives, were easily agreed among the three powers. With respect to reparations, which involved the immediate disposition of German resources and in fact the whole management of the German economy, responsibility was allocated as between the Soviet Zone, on the one hand, and the three Western Zones, on the other. The reparations agreement, in these terms, was hurriedly written at the very end of the conference after a long and fruitless wrangle over definitions of 'war booty', at a time when the evidence available to the British and American representatives appeared to indicate that the Soviets were already proceeding vigorously with a unilateral reparations policy. Thus, from the beginning, the operation of a unified Germany by agreement among the major powers was compromised.

It would be, I suspect, an error to blame the negotiators at Potsdam for the schizophrenia of that document. It has become evident that if a unified Germany is to be created out of a four-power agreement it will come about only by

a long and patient exploration of issues and of objectives, economic, political, and military. Given the history of Russian relations with the West over the previous forty years—for Russia a history of defeat and frustration, for the West of intervention, fear, and exclusion—there would appear to have been no simple diplomatic formula by which a unified operation of Germany might have been decreed in the summer of 1945. The flaws in the Potsdam Agreement are not, on the whole, fortuitous, despite the unsatisfactory circumstances which surrounded the drafting of the document.

Two courses were thus open to the Occupying Powers in the period after Potsdam: they could accept the split of Germany on the Elbe as permanent; or they could exploit the Control Council in Berlin, which was virtually all that remained of the concept of unity, to seek uniform solutions for all Germany, involving inevitable compromises among the powers and a dilution of unilateral authority in each of the zones. The split of Germany in the short run appeared to have certain advantages: it simplified the problem of policy formation, and it gave to both the East and West, in Europe, minimum assurance that Germany as a whole could not be turned offensively in either direction. On the other hand it offered no process whereby occupation could be ended by mutual consent; it threatened to cut Europe down the middle, in violation of that continent's natural political and economic structure; it threatened to make the economic and political life of Europe over the indefinite future a ground for manœuvre between the Soviet Union and the two great Western powers; and on a range of issues between the Soviet Union and the West, of the greatest importance to each, it threatened to violate the concept of Big Three unity and thus to undermine in a decisive way the rock on which the United Nations had been founded.

This momentous issue, which may well set the pattern for Soviet relations with the Western Powers throughout the world, has been examined by the Foreign Ministers at Moscow; and will be approached again in November, in London. Although the final issue remains in doubt, there is a central hopeful fact: neither the Soviet Union nor the Western Powers appear content with the present schism in Germany. This is a matter which has been much debated in the United States, and one on which policy has been formed since August, 1945. The predominant theme in American policy has been to seek a united Germany; that is, positively to achieve the compromises which might lead to major-power agreement in the centre of Europe, and thus to bring closer to reality in a crucial area the concept of Big Three unity. And, in fact, the American authorities in Berlin and elsewhere have sought vigorously to overcome the schizophrenia of Potsdam.

At its core, in the American view, such unity must have two agreed bases: a firm and explicit pact among the major powers that would keep Germany militarily disarmed; and a political structure for Germany based on free elections, which would make future German governments the function neither

of a German minority nor of an external power.

In terms of military politics, such a solution, by explicitly neutralizing Central Europe, is designed to remove the danger to the Soviet Union that Central or Eastern Europe might again be a base for invasion of Russia by land; and it would, symmetrically, remove the fear of military domination of Western Europe by the Soviet Union or by a Germany in alliance with the Soviet Union.

This solution would leave the political orientation of Germany to the vicissitudes of the open market of a free political life.

The concept evolved with respect to Germany can be generalized. It assumes that in some meaningful sense security issues can be separated from political and economic issues. It notes that the Big Three, none of which is strictly a European power, were forced to fight a bloody and expensive war when the structure of continental Europe proved unstable, and that each has a legitimate and continuing interest in seeing that the continent is never used again as a military instrument. It seeks to achieve on security issues, defined in a limited sense, firm agreement among the Big Three, and to leave the political and economic life of the area to self-determination. It recognizes the probability of continuing competition of ideas and influence between the Soviet Union and the West, but is willing to face that social science conflict so long as the rules are agreed and they do not involve the employment of force. That has been the dominant pattern of American policy in Germany, in Europe, and indeed in Asia, over the first post-war year.

This regional conception has been by no means as fully elaborated, with respect to particular areas, as the requirements for stability may ultimately demand. The pursuit of a unified Germany, in the larger interest of Big Three unity, does not fully take account of the legitimate fears in Europe of a united Germany as a political and economic force. In the context of Europe's future coal situation, for example, it would obviously be unwise to permit the coal exports of the Ruhr to be manipulated as a purely German resource. France could under such circumstances quickly fall under German political and economic dominance. And some provision for the disposition of Ruhr exports on criteria other than the German national interest will almost certainly be called for in the final German settlement.

Even more broadly, it seems likely that the stability of Europe, if it is not to split on the Elbe, may demand some form of United States of Europe related fully to the United Nations—avoiding a violation of its unity—as a further regional check on German actions, as well as to meet older and wider European aspirations. These considerations lead American representatives to propose, in the summer of 1946, an Economic Commission for Europe, to work within the orbit of the United Nations, and to begin the process of bringing the European Continent towards unity, on a democratic basis. While the large security issues of treaty-making have been loudly argued at a high diplomatic level, the Economic Commission has been unanimously accepted, and has quietly

proceeded into motion. Its fate depends on many factors, and above all on the achievement of an agreed settlement in Germany by the major powers. Its existence, however, attests to the reality of the will of Europe, East and West, to find terms on which it can develop as an undivided community.

An Economic Commission for the Far East has also been created. In that area, however, the major powers are even further from the goal of providing an agreed framework of security arrangements than in Europe. Nevertheless the general shape of a hopeful pattern of post-war evolution for all areas in dispute can be discerned, even if dimly through the confusion of current controversies among the major powers. In the American view it would involve :

1. A progress of transfer of military power from national authorities and regional alliances to the United Nations.
2. A series of major-power agreements on outstanding security issues, which would involve definite, concrete, long-range commitments for the United States in Europe and Asia; and machinery, either within or outside the Security Council, for dealing with other security issues that might arise.
3. A process of transfer of economic decisions from a national to a world basis, with the possibility of regional sub-organizations of the United Nations.
4. A gradual agreement on the conception of political self-determination, and its application gradually to various areas where one or another of the major powers now regards it as in dangerous abeyance.

Within this scheme the ability of American political and economic conceptions to survive, and their qualities of attraction for the rest of the world, would be left to the unfolding and competitive processes of non-military history.

The immediate obstacles which confront those of all nations who are engaged in attempting to achieve some such world structure are evident enough; and if one thing is clear, it is that we face a long effort at creation if we are to overcome the dangerous heritage of modern diplomatic and military history : an effort which, as Mr. Acheson recently said, will be with us through our lives "like the pain of earning a living."

The possibility of re-shaping the world in this image turns in large part, of course, on two issues : does the Soviet Union intend to use military force in pursuit of its national interests? Is the Soviet Union prepared to limit its direct intervention to security issues in the limited sense in which we should be likely to agree?

On the evidence of the post-war period it seems most unlikely that Soviet policy envisages the use of military force outside of international agreements, and the war that would follow. Looking ahead to the likely developments in weapons, it is indeed difficult to envisage a time when any responsible Soviet rulers would consciously undertake the risk of war. And thus far, at least, Soviet rulers have been responsible. Their policies have looked to the long sweep of the Russian interest. They have not, like the Nazis, been adventurers,

risking the fate of their nation in a wild gamble. And to do so runs counter both to the doctrines on which they are trained and to Russian prospects in a world at peace.

More serious doubt attaches to the ability to find among the Big Three the specific terms of the agreements that must be laid down, the rules that must be accepted and followed, if a unified framework of major-power accord on security matters is to be provided to the rest of the world. It is evident that the formulation of such agreements and rules will, at best, take a considerable period of time; for there are real and honest differences involved, of background, training, and national outlook. In Germany, for example, overt Soviet support for the Socialist Unity Party has been regarded with a certain suspicion in the West as an unwarranted interference in German political life, while the Soviet authorities have looked with equal suspicion on an organization of the British Zone which for long left considerable authority in the hands of a highly conservative, but nominally neutral, Civil Service. In the end both zones have had reasonably free elections. The issue of Germany and the problem there of finding common terms is by no means settled; but the evidence thus far does not rule out the possibility of our achieving, ultimately, solid agreement.

The history of negotiations since 1945 is clearly inconclusive; but it justifies the patient, if somewhat weary optimism with which American diplomats have pursued their travels. They are not an easy or a one-way process, these major-power negotiations. They require a creative effort of understanding on the part of all the persons and powers concerned, and a re-examination of conceptions, prejudices, and habits of thought which are only painfully disturbed or altered. All the participants in these discussions, at the various points throughout the world where they take place, must often have thought how much easier it is, emotionally and intellectually, to fight a war than to find the formulæ of peace. As Mr. Byrnes once remarked and Mr. Marshall will no doubt echo: "The Council of Foreign Ministers is a very difficult committee." But neither the personal nor the national will to continue the process of negotiation has yet been broken or even deflected.

Success depends, of course, not only on the Soviet Union, and on the other powers, but on the United States. There are, perhaps, four basic requirements which must be met if the United States is to contribute fully to a hopeful diplomatic evolution. First, the public interest in foreign affairs must be maintained, and their relation to the American interest driven home by constant education and re-education. Secondly, a national foreign policy must be maintained, and the present *ad hoc* arrangements for achieving it developed into agreed political practice. Thirdly, the United States must deal effectively and promptly with the onset of severe depression. Fourthly, American policy must avoid the danger of developing into a negative exercise in checking the initiative of the Soviet Union, and must furnish both resources and democratic leadership in the process of reconstruction which is likely to consume, at least, the

post-war decade.

All of these requirements are challenging, given the structure and traditions of American society. The last of these four requirements has been recently dramatized in the discussions which followed Mr. Truman's statement on aid for Greece and Turkey. It was widely appreciated in the United States that surplus military equipment was not enough; and that the success of Anglo-American intervention in Greece will depend, in the last analysis, on the ability to make the Greek government and the Greek economy operate effectively, rather than on the quantity and calibre of the guns delivered. Similarly, in the long run, and even perhaps in the short run, our ability to increase production of Ruhr coal is a matter of greater moment than the terms of membership on the permanent Danube River Commission; our ability to formulate and execute a constructive policy of economic welfare in the Middle East may well determine our influence there more than the disposition of troops; America's ability to export wheat, absorb imports, and avoid prolonged unemployment will certainly count for more than diplomacy designed to affect the method and outcome of East European elections. At the present time both elements in foreign policy are clearly legitimate. There is no question of abdication of positions, or of responsibilities: there is a question of emphasis and balance. It is to this question that an increasing amount of thought is likely to be given, in the United States, over coming months.

To the difficulties of the post-war world the United States brings a certain strength, as well as weaknesses which must be overcome: the physical resources of the country; the depth and unbroken continuity of its democratic tradition; a history of successful, if occasionally slow and raucous, adjustment to new circumstances; a willingness to experiment; a constructive energy; a persistent strand of idealism. These are the assets which it is the task of American statesmanship effectively to mobilize. The structure of American political life does not make that task easy. Although the recent revolution of American diplomacy is likely to hold the United States actively in world affairs, fluctuations in the degree and efficacy of American intervention are to be expected.

American history has been marked by only occasional periods when the full strength of the nation has been unified and made effective—usually in the face of crisis and under great leadership—but the intervening periods have not been without purpose. There are sober grounds for believing that the faith and the hope of many peoples which have suffused the adventure of American democracy from its beginnings will not be wholly disappointed in the era of diplomatic pioneering we all now face.

(The first part of AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY by Professor Rostow was published in the June 1947 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. THE GERMAN PROSPECT

DR. W. FRIEDMANN, in the first of two articles on the Military Government of Germany, said: "In attempting to solve the problem of Germany at Moscow, the Foreign Ministers cannot but reflect with grave hearts on the results of the first two years of Allied Military Government in Germany."* However gravely the Foreign Ministers may have pondered the problem, they did not find it possible to agree on a solution. "All these things," said Mr. Bevin in a recent foreign affairs debate,† "led on to a discussion of fundamental issues in which agreement was found on some points, divergence of opinion on others, and disagreement on the remainder." Unfortunately, taking the delegations as a whole, it seems true to say that the more fundamental the issue, the smaller the measure of agreement upon it. It is valuable, and even, as the Foreign Secretary claimed, encouraging, that the Conference should have succeeded in reaching a "tentative decision" about the control and co-ordination of the police. It is even more important that the delegations should have concurred in the view that the Potsdam figure for the quota of steel production should be revised. But the twin obstacles of reparations and a unitary constitution for Germany still stand, as they stood before Moscow, in the way of a quadripartite agreement on Germany and of a stable settlement of Europe.

Meanwhile, in spite of the immense achievements which stand to the credit of the Military Government, the outlook is even less promising than it was on the collapse of the German war machine two years ago. Materially, it is true, order has been brought out of chaos; a system of government has been created, shattered communications have been restored, a start has been made in restoring war damage, and the vital production of coal has been given its proper priority and, up to a point, the monthly figures have risen steadily above the levels of 1945 and the early months of 1946. Morally, the position has deteriorated. The high prestige of the conquerors has lapsed, partly because of their failure to solve the almost endless problems that have confronted post-war Germany and of the consequent sufferings of the German people, partly because of their failure to agree among themselves. The German lacks faith either in himself or his rulers, he sees no hope for the future, he has few if any consolations or rewards in the present and a great capacity for self-pity. He has few positive incentives to do good work, and being on the whole humanely treated,

* THE FORTNIGHTLY, April 1947.

† *Hansard*, May 15, 1947. Vol. 437. No. 105, col. 1728.

he does not need to work out of fear. In these circumstances some at least of the benefit of the material reconstruction that has been accomplished is being lost, and the figures even of coal production have tended to fall.

But above all, the German is seriously short of food, to an extent that has never been experienced in this country and is therefore but seldom imagined here. Not only are the rations themselves low, but the rigours of winter and the selfish hoarding spirit of the German farming community have made it impossible to honour the rations that have been authorized.

It is against this background, of quadripartite failure to agree and of the lack of any firm foundation for faith in the future of Germany, that the agreement for the reorganization of bi-zonal economic agencies in the British and American zones of Germany must be viewed. Great hopes for the beneficial effects of this have been expressed on high authority. On what are they founded?

In order to answer this question it is necessary first to examine the text of the agreement. It should be noted that it is to be in operation "pending the creation of administrative and governmental institutions for Germany as a whole," and "in order to facilitate the solution of pressing economic problems and the reconstruction of German economic life by the popularly controlled German agencies": in other words, the main responsibility for solving Germany's problems is to fall upon the Germans themselves.

The machinery by which these objects are to be attained consists of, first, an Economic Council selected by the *Landtag* of the various *Länder*; secondly, a full-time co-ordinating and executive body known as the Executive Committee and subordinate to the Economic Council and, thirdly, executive directors, responsible to the Economic Council for the administration of the bi-zonal departments, under the supervision of the Executive Committee. The Military Government is to delegate maximum responsibility for the conduct of bi-zonal functions to German agencies with due regard, it should be noted, to the principle of decentralization of administration. Decisions of the Council and of the Committee are to be taken by majority vote.

The functions allotted to the Council make it, subject to the approval of its decisions by the bipartite board of the two occupying Powers, virtually an economic parliament for the two zones. The Executive Committee, to be composed of one representative from each *Land* serving on a full-time basis, has the two functions of preparing ordinances for adoption by the Council on the one hand and of making regulations to implement, and co-ordinating the execution of, such ordinances on the other.

Such is the framework of the agreement. Many of its advantages are obvious. That responsibility for the "economic reconstruction of the two zones on the basis of a new plan for the agreed level of industry" should be placed on German shoulders is unquestionably right. How far the two zones can be reconstructed except within a united Germany remains extremely doubtful. They can only

achieve a balanced economy, and a reasonable way of life, on the basis of food imports from either the Russian zone or the United States. There is no hope, till the London Conference of next November at least, of Germany being treated by the four Powers as an economic whole. Consequently, until then, plans for the reconstruction of the two zones must go forward on the footing that for a sufficiency of food they must be dependent on Anglo-U.S. finance. Indeed, at the moment of writing *The Times* is reporting that the Minister of Food for North Rhine-Westphalia has proposed to Lord Pakenham a long term plan based precisely on large scale financing of the purchase of bread grains by the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

The efficacy of any remedy for any part of Germany must remain in doubt while the essential condition of the economic integration of the country remains unfulfilled. In spite of several satisfactory features, two questions have to be answered before it is possible to form any estimate of the new agreement's prospects even of partial success. Will the *Landtage*, which select members of the Council and the Committee and are the instruments for the execution of their ordinances, work for the welfare of the whole or promote local aims? How long can Britain, with her depleted stocks of dollars, continue to finance, mainly out of them, nearly £80,000,000 of relief imports? If she ceases to do so before November, what will be left of the bi-zonal agreement, or, indeed, of the zones themselves?

W. T. WELLS.

II. HUNGARIAN ANVIL

In material damage Hungary suffered more perhaps than any other European country involved in the 1939-1945 war, always excepting Soviet Russia. The Germans wrought havoc during the winter campaign of 1944-1945, particularly in the course of their retreat. The Russians contributed their share of destruction with the siege of Budapest; then, after liberation, their troops had their fling during the hundred days of looting and rapine—they had the savage deeds of the Hungarian forces fighting with the Germans on Russian territory to avenge; and thereafter, they took care to place the country in economic bondage by crippling reparation demands.

There followed the nightmare inflation period which came to an end with the stabilization of the *forint* currency on August 1, 1946. Seventy per cent. of Hungary's industrial plant was rendered inoperative or ruined and the basis of her agricultural export trade was destroyed. The grim facts, together with some characteristic vignettes of the plight of Hungary, were depicted by an American correspondent, Hal Lehrman, in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* in April last year. And yet, such is the resiliency of this gifted nation, so well has the four-pronged Coalition Government husbanded and administered the country's modicum of resources that, until the other day, Hungary appeared to be, more than any

other part of Eastern Europe, on the high road to economic recovery.

For, alongside the creation of a consistent price and wage structure, which ensured that nominal income should not exceed the value of available goods and services, industry and agriculture were fundamentally reorganized. In agriculture, the large estates were broken up and distributed to the peasants in rent-free small holdings, the effect being to transform the peasantry, generally speaking, into a conservative element. (So much so, that in one area the peasants are said to have sent a deputation to ask for the right to pay taxes, so they might feel that the land really belonged to them!) In industry output in 1946 reached 40 per cent. of the 1938 figure and now, it is said, the figure is more like 60 per cent. The national income for 1946-1947 showed an increase of 30 per cent. over that of 1945. (That increase, it is true, was largely in mining and in industrial production. The bulk of the nation has continued to eke out a wretched existence in conditions of poverty such as we can scarcely imagine.) Finally, a favourable balance of trade has been achieved, in the first place by exchanges with the other Soviet-controlled countries and Russia herself, but with good prospects of a wider range of markets.

It is important to emphasize that the stabilization of the currency was attained without foreign aid. But Hungary's achievement in self-help was duly recognized in the Western countries. Apart from supplying six million dollars' worth of raw cotton and grain seeds, the United States authorized a loan of fifteen million, later increased to thirty million, dollars to be expended on surplus American stocks in Germany. The Under-Secretary of Finance, Mr. Kemeny, a Social-Democrat, secured from London banking credits of £500,000 for the purchase of much-needed raw materials, cotton, rubber, machine-tools, etc., and these credits not only had the approval of the Treasury but carried with them also an Exports Credits Department guarantee to ninety per cent. of the risk.

All this has now been jeopardized, all hope of a smooth passage to a stable and progressive economy has been shattered by the Russians' crude exercise of the political domination which was indisputably theirs by right of victory and geography but itself a reaction to dollar-diplomacy, new style. Hungary is the first victim of the recent intensification of American-Russian rivalry. The hasty decision of the U.S. Government to apply the sanction of suspending all further credits, following the summary removal of Hungary's Prime Minister, can only have the effect of hastening the process of "Eastern democratization." Though Austria may prove to be the ultimate testing-ground, these latest developments mean that Hungary becomes inevitably the anvil on which the Russians will be beating out their peculiar conception of democracy. There is little or nothing that Americans can do about it except deliver notes of protest, and Britain's rôle as a moderating power is fatally impaired.

Compared with the Balkan peoples, it is true, the Hungarians are tough metal. It is because he knows his countrymen very well that Mathias Rákosi, the able leader of the Communist party, has always favoured the policy of *festina lente*.

Thus, in the autumn of 1945, against the will of Moscow, he agreed with the other party leaders to the holding of free elections, which resulted in a clear majority, in the country and in Parliament, for the Smallholders and, despite a great propaganda onslaught, a vote of no more than 17 per cent. for the Communists. This spring he was not in favour of forcing the issue when, following the timely discovery of the 'plot' to restore the Horthy régime, the Committee of Privileges decided that they would not surrender M. Béla Kovács to the judicial authorities, depriving him of his parliamentary immunity. On the very eve of the arrest by the Russian Army authorities of M. Kovács (February 26, 1947), Rákosi had joined in an inter-Party agreement that M. Kovács should merely be invited to present himself 'voluntarily' to the political police.

In the matter of the elimination of Mr. Ferenc Nágy Rákosi appears to have been a consenting party to the Russian stratagem, at the same time doing all he could to soften the blow for his Ministerial colleague. There is general agreement among those who have met him that Rákosi's ruthlessness will never be obtrusive. In his youth he was a member of the British Labour Party, then Under-Secretary of Commerce in the Bela Kun Government before spending fifteen years in Hungarian gaols and thereafter becoming for a time a Soviet citizen.

Contrary to common belief Russian influence does not depend mainly on dominance in the Control Commission and the occupation troops, of whom there are no more than 20,000 tucked away in the south-eastern corner of Hungary. It hinges rather on party leadership, superior in every way to that of the other parties in the Coalition, on Communist control of the political and military police, and on substantial economic power, through the joint Soviet-Hungarian industrial undertakings, control of the oil industry, air and river traffic and trade ties.

By the latest *coup* the Russians will probably have achieved what has been their principal aim since the shock of the November 1945 election, the disintegration of the Smallholders' Party. With the outlawing of all Hungarian middle-class elements who could in any way be identified with the Horthy régime and thus implicated in the recent, or any future, 'conspiracy' it becomes a solid agrarian party which can only form an opposition, outside the ranks of 'democracy', as interpreted in countries behind the 'iron curtain'. Numerically, it is true, they would form, together with the Freedom Party, which split off early last year, a strong combination, if real political freedom obtained. But the indications are that the elections, now scheduled for the autumn, after the harvest, will follow the Polish or Bulgarian pattern. The other parties cannot withstand a Communist demand for depriving a substantial section of the 1945 electorate of the franchise. No matter that the Social Democrats claim to have stronger roots in the working class than the upstart Communist Party. Because of the new pattern of power in the international sphere the Socialists are destined to lose ground, especially if, as seems likely, the Hungarian economy

becomes progressively closed to the West.

The banks will henceforth be firmly under State control, and Mathias Rákosi and his colleagues can now go ahead with their version of the Three Years' Plan which excludes foreign aid. It will mean a great deal more hardship for workers and peasants but, given the psychological background of Hungary, the fear of a new fascism, supported by the Truman doctrine, all the forces of the left will be rallied to the national appeal which the Communist leaders are now making.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

III. RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS.

The myth of the impeccability and invincibility of the German General Staff dies hard in Germany. In the shambles of the Third Reich, many Germans still probe hopefully for evidence that their Generals did not fail them. Of all the Nuremberg decisions perhaps the least popular in Germany was the conviction and sentencing to death of Field Marshals Keitel and Jodl. The Kesselring verdict has in turn been badly received. And the support given to Kesselring's cause by eminent Englishmen may well foster dangerous illusions in Germany.

The prestige of German generalship has survived many previous disasters. Mr. Sumner Welles has gone so far as to say that "the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff." Now the generals are doing what they can to keep their glory alive and untarnished. There are the fostered fantasies in Berlin about Field Marshal Von Paulus's army on the Russian steppes. There is the studied effort of the German Generals to re-establish the faith of the German people in their military prowess and to dissociate themselves from the mountain of war crimes which even they now admit to have taken place. "To attempt to shake this indictment as a whole would be useless," said Keitel's Counsel at Nuremberg. Yet there has been a consistent effort by the Generals to evade all personal responsibility either for Germany's defeat or for the atrocities committed by the German armed and police forces. Manstein, for instance, attributes the Wehrmacht's defeat to the fact that Hitler interfered too much in military affairs. Throughout the Generals have denied that they committed atrocities. Any which did occur they say were committed by men like Himmler and agencies like the S.S. As for the launching of aggressive wars on unwarned and unsuspecting peoples—that was Hitler's doing. The High Command's blueprints for invasion were done merely in the course of military duty. The generals themselves were without influence on the course of events. These are now the familiar arguments of the generals.

The refusal of the Nuremberg Tribunal to declare the German High Command and General Staff to be a criminal group or organization on the face of it

strengthened the generals' cause. In fact, however, the Tribunal made it plain that although the General Staff and High Command was neither an "organization" nor a "group" within the meaning of the Tribunal's Charter, the criminal responsibility of German generalship was overwhelming. Of the officers who constituted the General Staff and High Command, Lord Justice Lawrence stated:

They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women and children. They have been a disgrace to the honourable profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a group falling within the words of the Charter, they were certainly a ruthless military caste. The contemporary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the generations of the past. Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits their defence they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said. Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.

It is not the strength of character but the personal weakness of the generals which emerges most vividly from the captured German documents of the 1933-1945 era. For the most part the generals backed Hitler in 1933. But the Nazis did not want them as mere allies. Hitler wanted the generals completely under his thumb. I remember vividly how one of the generals whispered to me in the Herren Club in Berlin in 1934: "Just you wait. Soon we will have these wild men of the Nazi Party under control." In fact the next decade was the decade of the wild men. By 1935 Hitler had the whole military machine firmly in his grasp. As General Telford Taylor stated at Nuremberg: "Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist."

The outcome of their ambitions and their ineptitude in their relations with Hitler was that with very few exceptions they cheerfully pushed our civilization over the precipice of war and caused their own armed forces to be used for foul practices of terror, pillage, murder and mass slaughter.

When the war ended, the day of reckoning came. Several German field marshals and generals have already been tried and sentenced for breaches of the established laws of war. The American authorities at Nuremberg recently indicted Field Marshal Wilhelm List, Field Marshal Maximilian Von Weichs, Colonel General Lothar Rendulic and nine other Wehrmacht generals who took part in the German military occupations of Norway and the Balkans. Mass murder, terrorization, plunder, pillage and wanton destruction are the main charges against them.

The British trial of Kesselring was a parallel contribution to this vital effort to destroy the myths surrounding German generalship. Kesselring himself remained loyal to Hitler to the last. He ousted Rommel as Commander-in-

Chief Southwest because he was prepared to do what Hitler wanted, whereas Rommel was only willing to do what he himself thought correct tactically. On July 20, 1944, Kesselring was the first German commander to congratulate Hitler on his escape from assassination. But it was not for his espousal of Hitler's cause that he has been sentenced to death. A court of British officers found him guilty firstly of being concerned in the killing, as a reprisal, of some 335 Italians in Ardeatine Caves, outside Rome, and secondly of inciting and commanding the German armed forces and police in Italy under his command to kill Italian civilians as reprisals, as a result of which many Italian civilians were killed. Both offences were a flagrant violation of the laws and usages of war.

It is now suggested by some of our publicists that these proceedings are unjust because the German generals could say *tu quoque* to the British officers trying them. The facts do not warrant any such implied acknowledgment of guilt on our part. Atrocities there may have been in the heat of battle. Individual atrocities may have been committed from time to time. There was a case early in the war, when we were hard pressed, in which a senior British army officer struck some German prisoners of war. But this officer was court martialled for doing so—and dismissed the service. Nazi atrocities were on a quite different plane and scale. So far from being punished, they were planned and ordered by higher authority. To the Ardeatine massacre there were parallels all over Europe. To the murder of the 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III there were hundreds of equivalents on the Eastern Front.

The clamour in Kesselring's favour is dangerous. The whole object of our occupation of the British Zone of Germany is to de-nazify and to de-militarize it. It is therefore remarkable that the very men who personify that militarism should now be defended by British publicists in the name of Christian forgiveness and chivalry. The French are already asking nervously—must the British learn another lesson? Tread gently, you apologists for Kesselring. For you are treading on dynamite.

F. ELWYN JONES.

THE MONNET PLAN AND ITS CHANCES

BY R. P. SCHWARZ

THE post-war economies of Britain and France are faced with problems of reconstruction which, though different from each other in size and degree, show great similarity in kind.

To take differences first, France is appreciably more self-sufficient in food supplies than Britain. Whereas, in terms of value, Britain, during the pre-war years, produced just over half her food on her own soil, France could, on average, during the five years 1934-1938, satisfy about 85 per cent. of her needs from domestic production. Even in 1946, France covered about 82 per cent of her food consumption—reduced, it is true, to lower standards—from home sources. In this field, present shortages and deficiencies are due far more to unsatisfactory distribution and an inefficient system of rationing than to insufficient production.

A second difference is the less intense industrialization of France, compared with Britain. Whereas in Britain, in January 1947, 10,733,000 men and women, that is 52 per cent of the gainfully employed population, worked in industry (including building, public utilities, transport and shipping), the corresponding figures for France, in July 1946, were 5,600,000 and 27.65 per cent. British industry grew on coal. But French coal resources are insufficient. In 1938, for instance, French coal production covered only 69 per cent. of consumption and imports amounting to 22 million tons had to provide the rest. In the same year, Britain was still the world's largest coal exporter, with 37 per cent of the world's total coal exports.

Thirdly, "old age" had become an acute problem in France during the inter-war period. This applies both to the age distribution of her population and to her productive equipment. No doubt, some relationship exists between the ageing of the workers and that of the economy in which they work. True, the same problem was beginning to preoccupy Britain at about the same time. But while the position was deteriorating this side of the Channel, it had become critical in France. The small increase in the French population since 1900 was almost entirely due to the influx of immigrants. Britain's population was still rising. The increase since the Census of 1931 amounted to nearly 2,000,000. As for age distribution, the French economist and demographer A. Sauvy summed up the position when he wrote that

among the countries other than France in which the ageing process of the population has gone farthest—Britain, Sweden, Norway, Belgium—the proportion of old people (i.e. people of 60 and over) is that which existed in France in 1900. We (the French) are

thus half a century in advance of these countries (if the word advance is appropriate in this context.)*

Even when diagnosed in time, this ageing process, on its human side, is not easily influenced by deliberate and planned action. Effective human action is, however, possible to prevent the ageing of a country's economy. Yet, neither France nor Britain showed sufficient energy in opposing a Malthusian evolution. It would be difficult to say which of the two countries was more remiss in this respect. But if we assume the same degree of inertia on both sides of the Channel—and at times, France's political and economic cadres seemed even more closed to new ideas than their British counterparts—its effects, other things remaining equal, were bound to be considerably more serious for the French economy, inferior to the British in accumulated capital, intensity of development and potential resources.

Other things did not, however, remain equal during the 1939-1945 war. From recent statistics it would appear that France's capital losses during the war were heavier even than Britain's. An estimate of French losses published in *The Economist* of April 6, 1946, arrived at a total of Frs. 990 milliards of 1938 value (5,820 million at the average exchange rate of that year). In to-day's purchasing power, that sum is equivalent to roughly £10,000 million. Another, earlier, estimate arrived at a figure of about £7,000 millions of present-day purchasing power.† If we assume that French capital losses were no more than equal to the British figure of £7,300 million (the estimate given in Command Paper 6707), their incidence on French economy must have been far more severe.‡

II

Racing against time, both Britain and France must to-day make good the errors and the neglect of the past and renew their whole apparatus of production. In both countries, the necessity of heavy capital expenditure has made it imperative to draw up an inventory of existing resources, to be set against a list of probable requirements. In Britain, the *Economic Survey for 1947* (Command 7046) fulfilled this, mainly analytical, task. In France, Monsieur Jean Monnet, with the help of Messieurs Marjolin and Vergeot and eighteen *Comités de Modernisation* (the equivalent of the British Working Parties) established the *Premier Plan de Modernisation et d'Équipement*, published in December 1946. The *Rapport Général* which embodies this Plan and the reports of the various working parties are, in part at least, devoted to a similar comparison of resources and requirements. But the *Rapport* goes much fur-

* Alfred Sauvy, *Bien-être et Population*, Edition Sociale Française, Paris, 1945.

† See Henri Solente, *Les Conditions de la Reconstruction*, in *Le Monde*, Paris, April 22-23, 1945.

‡ At a rough estimate, the incidence represents 36.5 per cent. of national wealth in the French case against 25 per cent. in the British. This assumes that French national wealth corresponding to Britain's £30,000 million (Cmd. 6707) was £20,000 million. The latter figure is derived from the 60:40 ratio agreed upon in 1939 between Britain and France for the division of war costs payable abroad.

ther than the British White Paper in that it is at the same time a comprehensive four-year investment programme which specifies production targets, priorities of execution, cost estimates and methods of finance. As compared with the White Paper, the Plan covers a far wider field, both in space and in time.

III

Over the four years 1947-1950, the Monnet Plan foresees total capital expenditure of Frs. 2250 milliards subdivided as follows:

	<i>In milliard Frs. (Prices of June 1946)</i>	<i>Equivalents in million £ (£1 = Frs. 480)</i>
Reconstruction	1100	2292
Deferred maintenance	430	896
Modernization and increase in capacity of production	720	1500
	<hr/> 2250	<hr/> 4688

Of the total expenditure, Frs. 1210 milliards (£2,521 million) represent expenditure on buildings and public works and Frs. 1,040 milliards (£2,167 million) expenditure on plant and equipment.

The cost estimates are, by now, obsolete on account of changes in the price levels, both external and internal, since June 1946. French wholesale prices rose by just under half between June 1946 and March 1947. American wholesale prices have risen by a third since the same date. As price levels will undoubtedly undergo further modifications, upwards or downwards, over the four year period 1947-1950, the financial cost of the Monnet Plan can best be measured by comparison with the latest estimates of French national income.* The authors of the Monnet Plan expect French national income, at the prices ruling in June 1946, to total Frs. 2,700 to 3,000 milliards (£5,625 to £6,250 million) in 1947 and to reach Frs. 3,700 milliards in 1950 (which is 37 per cent. more than the lower and 23.3 per cent. more than the higher figure for 1947). The estimated total cost of the Plan thus represents the equivalent of 9 or 10 months' national income as it accrued at the beginning of its fulfilment.

During 1947, the first year of the Plan, investments are expected to total Frs. 460 milliards (£958 million), that is, between 15.5 and 17 per cent. of the national income. Including maintenance, capital expenditure during 1947-1950 is estimated to reach annually between 23 per cent. and 25 per cent. of the

* National income is defined as "the total mass of goods and services available to the French population during the year considered." A note on page 88 of the *Rapport* foreshadows the publication of a French "National Income White Paper" on the methods and sources used in computing this income. The Sterling figures above as also those given elsewhere in this article must not be taken to represent precise equivalences. Frs. 3,000 milliards will not to-day in France buy a mass of goods and services equivalent to that which could be secured in Britain for £5,625 million. On a conservative estimate, the domestic purchasing power of the French Franc is 30 per cent. below the figure corresponding to its exchange rate. Conversions are given exclusively to convey an idea of the orders of magnitude involved.

national income. That does not, however, mean that Frenchmen will have to achieve this unusually high rate of savings. Of the Frs. 460 milliards required in 1947,* just under one-third, namely 140 to 150 milliards are expected to be secured from foreign credits and only the remainder will have to come from current private savings (240 to 250 milliards) and undistributed profits (70 milliards).† Current private savings and undistributed profits combined represent some 10 per cent. of the national income.

IV

Thus, the financial requirements of the Monnet Plan will compel a temporary reduction of consumer expenditure and, conversely, a higher expenditure on capital goods. The same principle has governed all Soviet five-year plans. In the French case, the reasons for the adoption of this same principle are, however, non-military. Nor does the Plan sacrifice the consumer to anything like the same extent. It is so conceived as to raise French production to the 1938 level, by the end of 1946; to the 1929 level (which was about 25 per cent. higher) by the middle of 1948; and by a further 25 per cent to about 155 per cent of the 1938 level, by 1950. That does not however mean that the French consumer will enjoy the full measure of the increased output. A far larger part of the production will have to be exported than in the past. For there is no other way of restoring equilibrium in the French balance of payments. Its present disequilibrium is worse than that of British external accounts.

But whatever the short-term sacrifices, the authors of the Plan plead rightly: Each of the fundamental tasks with which French economy is confronted leads back to the necessity of renewing its productive equipment and its methods. It would be illusory to think that France could shirk this effort and return to her mediocre pre-war condition. The alternative to modernization is not a return to the position of the past, but constantly growing material decadence In conclusion, one cannot say that France has any choice. For there is no choice for her other than between progressive decay and immediate action.

If the targets set by the Plan are reached, output in key industries will develop as follows:

	1938	1947	1950	1950 in per cent. of
				1938
Coal production (million tons)	47.6	55.5	65	136.5
Electricity (milliard KWH): total	20.7	26.0	37.0	178.6
from water-power	11.6	13.0	20.5	176.7
Steel production (million tons)	6.2	7.0	11.0	177.4
Cast-iron mouldings (ditto)	0.7	1.2	2.7	385.7

* The *Economic Survey for 1947* (p. 31) states among the targets for 1947 the expenditure of 20 per cent. of the national income on capital and maintenance.

† Whether this is comparable to the 8 per cent. shown in Table 11 of the British National Income White Paper (Cmd. 7099) for private savings including undistributed profits, must remain in doubt. Too little is known at present of the methods used for computing the French national income

Cement (million tons)	3.8	6.0	13.5	355.0
Agricultural machinery (thousands)				
(a) Tractors	2.7	12.3	?	—
(b) Cultivators		6.0	16.0	—
Railways (million tons carried)	133	160.0	240.0	180.4

Great emphasis is placed on the modernization of French agriculture. In this field, the aims are (a) to increase output of cereals per acre by at least a quarter so as to obtain, by 1950, from a smaller sown surface at least the same output as the average of the 1934-1938; (b) to intensify production of secondary cereals, fodder, potatoes and industrial plants (hemp, oilseeds, flax, tobacco); (c) to increase the livestock population, raise meat production to the pre-war average and lift milk and cheese production substantially above that average; (d) to mechanize agriculture by the large-scale use of tractors and cultivators. On this last point, the *Rapport* recalls that before 1939, France numbered one tractor to every 200 farmers, against 43 in Britain and 22 in the U.S.A. Capital expenditure on agriculture is budgeted for at Frs. 366 milliards (£754 million) of which Frs. 192 milliards (£400 million) are allocated to agricultural machinery. The gross increase in value of the annual agricultural output expected from this investment is conservatively estimated at Frs. 60 milliards. At that rate the new capital would be amortized within six years or so.

Higher output and greater productivity are indeed particularly necessary in agriculture. With 7,140,000 workers, agriculture and forestry, in 1938, occupied 35 per cent of the total gainfully employed population. It was therefore the largest French industry. Even in 1950, agriculture and forestry are still expected to occupy first place, with 6,250,000 workers (approximately 30 per cent of all gainfully employed). Through greater productivity, the Plan expects from a labour force reduced by 9 per cent in numbers an output representing 111 per cent of the 1934-1938 average. Labour productivity would thus increase by about 27 per cent.

V

France suffers from a shortage of manpower much in the same way as Britain. The increase in output, expected from the Monnet Plan, can only be achieved by more intense mechanization, by greater productivity of labour, and by longer working hours. France cannot count on any appreciable increase in the total labour force. Excluding the distributive trades, public administrations, the professions and the armed forces, the labour force active in production should, according to the Monnet forecasts, reach 14,450,000 by 1950, that is 800,000 workers more than in 1946, but 200,000 fewer than in 1938. Of the additional 800,000 workers, part is to come from organized immigration (estimated at 350,000 for 1947). Reduction in the strength of the armed forces is to provide another 150,000 to 200,000. The remainder is expected from the distributive trades, rehabilitation of disabled workers,

postponement of the retirement age, displaced persons, and last but not least, from women not at present gainfully employed who number close on two million. But the main effect must come from greater productivity of labour and longer working hours. In 1938, the average working week in industry did not exceed 39 hours. To-day, the normal length of the working week is 48 hours (even though its legal definition remains at 40 hours with overtime remunerated at higher rates). All the estimates of the Monnet Plan are indeed based on a 48-hour week. Other things remaining equal, this factor alone should, in theory, cause output to rise by about 23 per cent. The main increase is, however, expected from increased mechanization and rationalization measures. Compared with 1938, these two factors alone are to provide increases in output per man-hour ranging from 13 per cent. (coal mining) to 57 (automobile industry).

In a general way, the French worker, according to the *Rapport*, produced, before 1939, only about one third of the output of the U.S.A. and only about half that of the British worker, largely on account of inadequate capital equipment and insufficient rationalization. Comparative figures in this field have no more than indicative value. But there is no doubt that a wide margin separates French productivity from that of France's chief industrial competitors. And even the improvements expected as a result of the Monnet plan reforms may not suffice to wipe it out.

VI

French production figures for the first quarter of 1947 show continued progress. But as they reflect action taken even before the Plan was officially adopted, on January 11, 1947, they teach us little about its actual fulfilment. The latest known index of industrial production (January 1947) was still 11 per cent below the level of 1938 which should, in principle, have been reached by the end of last year, although indices for some individual industries (coal, glass, rubber, electricity output) substantially exceeded the 1938 level.

The success of the Monnet Plan depends evidently on a conjunction of numerous individual factors. They may conveniently be subdivided into external and internal factors, according to origin. Among the first, none is more important than the position of the balance of payments. The execution of the Plan requires imports of plant and equipment to the extent of Frs. 250 milliards (£521 million), but equally of raw materials and, in a smaller degree, of food. By 1950, the Plan expects the balance of payments to be in equilibrium. Meanwhile, the deficit on current account, for the four years 1946-1949, is expected to reach Frs. 625 milliards (£1,302 million) of which the deficit for 1946 (the year before the inauguration of the Plan) represents Frs. 248 milliards (£577 million). In reality, the 1946 deficit, thanks to the satisfactory progress of exports, but perhaps also on account of a lag in imports,

seems to have been appreciably lower, namely, Frs. 149 milliards (£310 million)* This figure is only £90 million lower than the estimate for Britain's deficit in 1946. But it derives from a balance sheet total that, at a rough estimate, is at best no more than one-half of the British, and thus denotes even worse disequilibrium.

The Monnet Plan expects to cover the total deficit of Frs. 625 milliards (£1,302 millions)

	<i>In milliard Francs</i>	<i>In million £</i>
by the disposal of gold reserves and foreign assets	240	500
by foreign credits already secured	222	462.5
by foreign credits still to be secured	163	339.5
	<hr/> 625	<hr/> 1302.0

Against the last-mentioned item, France obtained in May of this year a credit from the Bretton Woods Bank of \$ 250 million (£62.2 million) and a further \$ 25 million (£6.22 million) on short-term from the Bretton Woods Monetary Fund. That leaves some £267 million to be covered. If the Plan shows results, that sum will no doubt be forthcoming. Substantial amounts of foreign currency, gold and other assets are still being hoarded in France. But, meanwhile, French dollar and hard currency expenditure seems to be running ahead of schedule. In a general way, to forecast the evolution of the balance of payments for another four years is at the best of times an extremely difficult and risky business. The accuracy of the Monnet forecasts hinges in a large measure on developments in the level of world prices, on the evolution of American economic policy and on the avoidance of another American slump. In two of these three respects at least, prospects are unfavourable.

As to internal factors, the endorsement of the Plan by the employer and the labour sides alike and, in particular, the return to the 48-hour week, are favourable elements. But against this, French internal prices have not yet found a stable level. There is an evident disparity between the wholesale prices of agricultural products, on the one side, and industrial products, on the other. Taking the 1938 level as 100, the indices of March 1947 stood at 945 for agricultural, at 756 for industrial, products. Hoarding by the peasants maintains in being a black market the "indices" of which move in the economic stratosphere. As requirements cannot be satisfied at official prices, there are constant strikes for higher wages. This factor endangers the whole financial basis of the Plan. Yet, hoarding will not cease before French public finances have been reformed, thus removing monetary uncertainties. The French peasants will not increase their deliveries as long as they expect a further depreciation in the purchasing power of the franc. While the Monnet Plan recognizes that capital expenditure must be covered by borrowing, at home and abroad, it also emphasizes the necessity of balancing the ordinary budget.

*See Pierre Uri, "Survey of French Economic Conditions", London and Cambridge Economic Service, Vol. XXV, Bulletin, II, May 12, 1947. Monsieur Uri is a member of the *Commissariat du Plan*.

The ordinary budget cannot be genuinely balanced without a wholesale reform of the present unwieldy and antiquated fiscal system. Until this is achieved, the success of the Plan will be in doubt. The financial Inventory published in March 1947 on the instructions of the Minister of Finance, Monsieur Schumann, provides a useful analysis of the present tax structure and throws light particularly on the evolution of tax receipts and the tax burden. But it is a static analysis, not a dynamic reform plan. Any serious attempt to reform French public finances must contain three elements: simplification of the tax system; unification of the budget; redistribution of the tax load as between agriculture and industry. The position, in 1946, was preposterous. Direct taxes were collected under eleven different schedules. Local taxes, producing in all Frs. 10.4 milliards (£22 million) were collected under 22 different headings, from a tax on street sweeping to one on dogs and fun fair machines. The industrial and commercial profits tax and the tax on wages and salaries were expected to produce, respectively, 5 per cent and 13 per cent of total budgetary receipts; agricultural profits tax no more than 1.06 per cent. Yet, according to the estimates of French national income for 1946, agriculture produced, with Frs. 460 milliards 18.2 per cent. of the total national income.* This situation has been constantly growing worse for many decades until it has, by now, reached the point of absurdity. French peasants have in practice, if not at law, succeeded to the fiscal privileges of the class which they dispossessed in 1789. And they may be preparing for themselves a fate very similar to that of their noble predecessors. Since 1939, France, under the pressure of events, has compelled her *rentiers* to pay taxes by doing away with bearer, in favour of nominative, securities. Wage earners, even before P.A.Y.E. was introduced in 1939, have long been under a "disability" from the point of view of tax evasion. The tightening up process remains to be completed by compelling the French farmer to bear his share of the fiscal burden and, to a lesser degree, by subjecting the professional classes, next to the farmers probably the greatest tax evaders, to stricter accountancy rules.

At this point, the Monnet Plan becomes a political problem. From the political angle, the reception it received had its favourable and less favourable aspects. Among the first counts the agreement, already mentioned, of capital and labour on the execution of the Plan. It is the combined work of both and therein resides its value. Among the less favourable aspects count the reasons for this agreement, which are frequently conflicting and sometimes diametrically opposed. Yet, even this factor may ultimately be turned to good account. For no party can wish to take power in a country the economy of which is well-advanced on the road to self-extinction. This negative factor may still offer the Monnet Plan its fairest chance.

* Pierre Uri, op. cit.

THE TEN-YEAR HOUSING PROGRAMME

BY GILBERT McALLISTER, M.P.

FROM the General Election of 1945 to February 28, 1947, 360,000 families were found new homes in the United Kingdom. Of these 151,000 families were provided with accommodation by the repair of existing dwellings, including 112,000 families re-housed by the repair of unoccupied and severely war damaged dwellings and 39,000 by the conversion and adaptation of existing premises: 170,000 were provided with houses by the construction of new dwellings of which 70,700 were permanent and 99,451 were temporary houses. A further 40,000 were found accommodation by the requisitioning of unoccupied houses for residential purposes (26,000), by the provision of temporary huts (3,500) and by the occupation of Service Camps (10,000). Of the 70,000 new permanent houses, 37,000 were built by private builders under licence and 33,000 by local authorities. Of the 37,000 built by private enterprise, 32,000 were built for sale or at the request of private owners: 4,000 represented houses totally destroyed during the war and since rebuilt, again for private owners.

This achievement is a considerable one and so incomparably better than the results achieved immediately after the 1914-1918 war that those who set out to criticize the Labour Government's success in housing are easily answered by Government supporters pointing to the fact that in the first full year of re-housing after the General Election of 1918 (the year 1919-1920) only 3,502 houses were built in England and Wales. So whatever mistakes may have been made, whatever failures in co-ordination there may have been, the Government's record on the facts alone is an outstanding one, both legislatively and administratively.

In addition to this achievement there have been war damage repairs to houses which had suffered varying degrees of damage from slight to substantial. During the twenty-three months ending February 28, 1947, 692,000 war-damaged dwellings were made wind and weathertight, and, indeed, within limits of materials available, restored to their pre-war standard. This is a fact which is easily lost sight of because it does not affect the number of dwellings provided; it does not provide a single new house for one additional family, but nevertheless it absorbs a large part of the manpower available and is a heavy drain on the material position.

Nor indeed is this the end of the story. So far I have merely summarized the houses actually completed and the families actually re-housed. But re-

housing a nation—and the provision of four million new houses in the United Kingdom between 1945 and 1955, which is the Government's objective and which is a public works operation without parallel in any period in any country, is a cycle of events and not simply one event. There is the acquisition of sites, there is preparation of these sites, there is the tendering for contracts, there is the allocation of contracts, there is the actual building process. To take at any point of time the figures of houses completed, therefore, as I have done on February 28, 1947, is by no means to tell the whole story. It is also necessary to consider the number of houses in course of construction. On February 28, 1947, new permanent houses under construction amounted to 213,000, while temporary houses in the same state were almost 10,000. The number of houses under construction therefore reached a total not exceeded in any year after the 1914-1918 war until 1927, eight years after the Armistice. Again a convincing proof of housing activity with no small drive and energy behind it and incomparably more successful than Coalition efforts after the 1914-1918 war.

Obviously if a re-housing programme is to be achieved the necessary manpower and materials must be mobilized. Obviously, too, if the operation is to be successful the supply of materials to the sites must keep pace with the labour available. During the war an acute scarcity of building labour was anticipated by Lord Portal, Mr. Willink and the other Coalition Ministers responsible. From the General Election of 1945 to the end of December 1946 operatives employed in the building industry had increased by seventy-four per cent. and operatives actually at work by eighty-one per cent. At the end of December the labour employed in the building industry numbered 1,250,000 men, a figure which shows a remarkable recovery from the devastating dislocation of the war years to the point where the industry, from the labour supply point of view, was nearly back to normal and indeed was only 60,000 short of the maximum pre-war figure. The Government showed an admirable sense of urgency in building up this labour force because it was natural to expect that many returning soldiers previously in the building industry might have sought new occupations in which they could use techniques acquired during their war service. There was therefore a rush to get started with the programme, a rush which has had some undesirable consequences but which was nevertheless fully justified if the building industry was to be put in a position to carry out the gigantic Ten Year Plan. Equal success did not attend the Government's efforts to mobilize materials and at the beginning of 1947 the Government had to state that "the scarcity of materials is a major obstacle to the 1947 building programme." "Production during 1947," the Government said, "is dependent on many uncertain factors, particularly on the supply of fuel for production and transport, the recruitment of further labour, and the possibility of finding alternatives for certain of the scarcer raw materials, some of which, such as soft wood, lead, and linseed oil, are scarce

throughout the world."

The responsibility for these world shortages cannot in any case be apportioned to the British Labour Government. The Government indeed has made the most desperate efforts to overcome these difficulties. But when Sweden, from which normally can be expected large supplies of timber, laid down the condition that she would only export timber if she received coal, the Government was placed in a dilemma which was not easily resolved. The brick position was for a time a matter of acute concern and indeed was brought back to peak production only to be faced again with a sharp decline caused by the fuel crisis which began in January 1947. To meet the 1947 programme a monthly production of something like 450 million bricks was required. Faced with drastic fuel cuts, production in January 1947 dropped to 380 million while the stock position was 600 million bricks less than it was twelve months earlier. Other materials suffered similarly; cement production dropped to less than half the necessary production figure of about 400,000 tons. The production of plaster boards fell to considerably under half of the necessary production. The manufacture of metal doors and windows went down to almost one-third of what is necessary. It is therefore clear that the Government's statement that "production during 1947 is dependent on many uncertain factors" was more than justified, and the further announcement that the target of 240,000 houses to be completed by December 31, 1947, would not be fulfilled was not surprising. It is difficult to form a realistic estimate of what will in fact be achieved but if 180,000 houses are completed by the end of the year then the Government will have performed a prodigious feat of national re-building.

It is clear that the manpower position has over-run the material position, a state of affairs which can be attributed first of all to the world scarcity of basic materials. It is also due to a failure of co-ordination in the placing of contracts and the faulty allocation of materials between Government departments and between local authorities and private builders. To say that the licensing position became chaotic is perhaps both to over-state and oversimplify a complex and difficult matter but to say that there were many demands by different agencies for the materials is to under-state the failure to achieve over-all planning. It is true that the Ministry of Health issued repeated and grave warnings, the first as early as November 1945, telling local authorities to restrict their programmes, and especially their contracts, to what could be achieved in the ensuing twelve months. It is equally true that local authorities paid no attention to this, placed far too many contracts, gave far too many permits to private builders, and that the Ministry of Works itself sanctioned the construction of too many buildings not remotely connected with the re-housing programme. This in turn led to considerable disparity between the time taken by private enterprise to complete a house for private sale and the time taken by private enterprise to build a house under contract

for a local authority. The period of construction by private enterprise of a house for sale averaged about eight months, the period of construction of a house by private enterprise building for a local authority averaged twelve months in England and Wales and a good deal more in Scotland.

Was it that the contractor building for the local authorities just did not care? Was it that the workers on the houses for sale received completely illegal incentive rewards? Was it that the building labour was not producing the amount of work which they ought reasonably to produce? These are questions that permit of no easy answer but certainly there is sufficient evidence to suggest that all three questions could be answered in the affirmative.

In determining their target figure of 240,000 houses in 1947, the Government obviously based its calculations on the fact that of the total labour force 300,000 men were to be allocated exclusively to the building of permanent houses. Indeed, in the White Paper published in January 1947 the Government says quite clearly that it thinks it "reasonable to estimate that the building force will be sufficient to complete 240,000 permanent houses during the year," a total made up of 190,000 local authority houses, 15,000 houses destroyed during the war to be re-built by private enterprise, and 35,000 houses privately built for sale.

Before the war the proportion of houses built by men employed in house-building was one to one, so that in twelve months the 300,000 men who were employed in house-building built 300,000 houses. (It should be remembered that this ideal state of affairs was not achieved until seventeen years after the 1914-1918 war, in the years 1936, 1937 and 1938). Building larger houses than the pre-war standard municipal house, the Government in its calculation is assuming that the production of one house will absorb fifteen man-months of labour, so that three men will now produce three houses in four years. Therefore, with a labour force of 300,000 the hope was that 20,000 local authority houses would be completed every month. This was certainly not an unreasonable objective if the contingencies of fuel and materials which had to be taken into the reckoning had not so quickly turned from a possibility to reality. But again it should at least be recognized that the Government was aiming at a standard rate of house construction in 1947 which was not achieved in the United Kingdom until eight years after the 1914-1918 war. The Government therefore cannot be accused on any account of complacency in this matter. They have attempted boldly to bring the industry back to a pre-war production rate in record time and the only mild censure that they may deserve is that since people seize on target figures and ignore all the conditional 'ifs' and 'ands' there is certain to be some degree of disappointment that they cannot be reached.

Before turning to the difficulties in the building industry itself, let me examine briefly the temporary housing position. From the moment that Mr. Winston Churchill announced the programme of temporary pre-fabricated

bungalows in his broadcast speech in 1943 I condemned the project. It was probably the most misconceived, ill-begotten attempt at the formulation of a housing policy that the world has ever seen. Mr. Aneurin Bevan as Minister of Health was undoubtedly right to condemn the whole fantastic scheme and to announce soon after he had taken office that his aim would be to construct the maximum number of permanent full-sized houses as quickly as possible. The Coalition Government estimated that 10,000 men could produce 100,000 temporary houses in one year. That this was nonsense, setting out to delude the public, is proved by the fact that the British Iron and Steel Federation undertook to supply 20,000 pre-fabricated steel bungalows by the end of December 1946: in fact they supplied 264. In no single instance has the idea of houses being factory built and ready for delivery to the site on the mass production basis achieved by the aircraft and the automobile industries been realized. The nearest approach to this realization has been the production of aluminium houses under direct Government control and organization, inaugurated by the Labour Government. Nevertheless so much work had been done on the preparation for the production of temporary houses, so many architects, so many senior executives and so many high-grade technicians of all kinds have had to concentrate their energies on the design, prototype production and production planning of the temporary housing programme that it would have been equally wrong to drop the plan altogether before similar work could be done on the production of permanent houses of a non-traditional character.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan therefore announced a restricted temporary housing programme and, as I have shown, the number of temporary houses built in the United Kingdom by February 28, 1947, reached 99,451. The production process had been steadily improving. The production of two temporary houses (without regard to the preparation of the sites and the servicing) absorbed the labour of one man for one year. The time taken for erection on the sites decreased from four months to two months. By the autumn of 1946 production of temporary houses had risen to 2,600 a week. It was at this point, in my view, that the Minister of Health should have had the courage to change his mind. He should, I think, have announced his intention to proceed with the construction of temporary houses for a further six months. This would not seriously have affected his plans for the production of permanent houses (although there would have been some diversion of labour and materials) but it would have given the country an additional 20,000 temporary houses and avoided a great deal of unnecessary dislocation and some degree of unemployment. The spectacle of factories—some of them in the development areas—which two months earlier were performing a vital part in the national housing drive, standing idle, many of the workers declared redundant and their management at wits' end to find new opportunities of service to the public, was not a pretty one and a more flexible Minister would have seen to

it that the change-over from the temporary housing programme to the permanent housing programme was not so sudden nor so drastic.

Now let me turn to the building industry itself. The building industry in the United Kingdom consists of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers and the National Federation of Building Trades Operatives. The former is inevitably private enterprise and traditionally Conservative and the latter is inevitably Labour and traditionally Socialist. But it is in this industry and in these two organizations that the difference between the Conservative outlook and the Socialist outlook is so small as to be microscopic. It is true that the building industry in the past has had much to put up with and nowhere more than in house building. In these days of full employment and higher wages it is difficult even for those concerned to throw their minds back to the time when a fully qualified craftsman received only 1s. 6½d. per hour and a labourer 1s. 2¾d. per hour—the position in rural areas in 1941. This meant that for working a forty-four-hour week the building trade craftsman got 67s. 10d. a week and the labourer 54s. 1d. a week—if he had the opportunity to work a full week. The biggest curse of the building industry and of the building trade employee was loss of work through inclement weather, "wet time" as the men called it. It was not until 1937 that the first steps were taken to abolish finally this hardship and handicap. To-day, however, the building industry has its guaranteed week. It is perhaps the only industry whose wage rates, both minimum and maximum, are laid down by Statute. Both sides of the industry have until now resolutely set their faces against anything in the nature of an incentive bonus scheme. The Government, it is said by some, has been timorous and has failed to take the necessary drastic action in the face of the opposition of the building trades unions. It is easy to advise drastic action: it is perhaps not so wise to adopt it in dealing with an industry whose co-operation must be wholehearted if success is to be achieved. At the same time the industry must face the fact that men work hardest and that production is highest where there is additional reward for additional effort. It is clear that some private contractors working on the production of houses for private sale are, despite the illegal character of the transaction, offering incentive bonuses of one kind or another (tax-free services are not unknown) and as a result are getting their houses up more quickly than where they are working for a local authority which naturally cannot easily countenance any practice outside the law. Nor is it easy to apply to an industry so many-sided as the building industry, representing so many different crafts and skills the idea of the *standard hour of work*.* Until the standard hour of work is known for every trade and for every district the universal application of incentive bonus schemes would not be

* As we are going to Press the Rt. Hon. Charles Key, M.P., Minister of Works, announces that an agreement has been reached in principle between employers and employees on the need for incentive schemes in the building industry. The Minister's statement is, however, described as "pre-mature" by building trades union leaders.

possible. But to say that and to admit difficulties is one thing. To say that it is impossible is quite another thing. It is at least certain that the present position of wages, which are dependent on time and no other factor, is fraught with the utmost danger to the nation's house building programme. At the end of 1945 an increase in the wage rates was granted. Since then there has been no discernible improvement in production. There has on the contrary been in certain trades a discernible decrease in production, while the output of the bricklayer in Glasgow particularly has become a byword. The Unions recently made another claim for an increase in wages but this has been rejected. There may be a period of labour difficulties as a result. Surely the time has come for both sides of the industry to examine the whole problem afresh in the light of modern industrial knowledge and practice to see whether a new and more satisfactory scheme might be evolved. An incentive bonus policy need have no adverse repercussions on the minimum wage rate structure.*

Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health and therefore the Minister charged primarily with responsibility for housing (a function discharged in Scotland by the Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph Westwood), is a man of energy, resource and enormous dialectical ability. In debate he is among the foremost Parliamentarians of our time. In his first speech as Minister he revealed an over-all grasp of the housing problem which has not been excelled by any of his predecessors, even if I had to enter a caveat against his perpetuation of the policy of special subsidies for tenement buildings on expensive sites (a practice which subjugates the interests of decent housing to the high land costs). He has vastly improved housing standards. He has a singular appreciation of questions of amenity. He is altogether against the one-class community so characteristic of the pre-war dormitory housing scheme. He pays lip service to Lewis Mumford whom he may have read but has not studied. Occasionally he goes haywire and following Le Corbusier (before he saw the light) advocates skyscraper flats as a feature of the English rural scene. He can claim a large share of the credit for the success of the housing policy. He has to share along with the entire Government responsibility for the failure of co-ordination which was inevitable as soon as the Government abandoned their election intention to create a Ministry of Housing. That there has been a failure of high level co-ordination is clear beyond a doubt and efforts to remedy the deficiency on the regional level will only mitigate but not cure the disease. There is in addition a puritanical reluctance, based partly on party beliefs and party misconceptions, to trust the great private organizations within the building industry. The best of these in war and in peace have given magnificent service to the country; the worst of them have gained for the

* The standard hour of work is defined as the amount of work an average workman, working at average speed and making allowance for fatigue and other factors can produce in sixty minutes of time. It is the basis of well conceived incentive bonus schemes.

whole industry an unpleasant reputation.

Labour Members of Parliament cherish a good many hates. They hate the landlords perhaps above all, they are not very keen on bankers, but they cherish a special malevolence for the "the speculative builder." He is the author of a hundred wrongs, from ribbon development and shoddy building to the pitiless robbing of the ex-Serviceman and the widow. And there is just enough truth in all that to make sense. But in their condemnation there is little discrimination. That may be pardonable in a back-bencher but is intolerable in a Minister. The building industry, and especially the large-scale building industry, was willing and is still willing to place its entire resources at the disposal of the Government. They are not encouraged by "let's shoot the lot" speeches or the suggestion that individually and collectively they are rogues and scoundrels. They are not encouraged either by the fact that in Great Britain to-day there are 68,000 building "firms" on the register, each consisting of one man. This is not to deploy a labour force: this is to dissipate it and render it incapable of action on a national scale. It is not too late, but it is certainly not too early, for the Minister and the Government to seek the whole-hearted co-operation of the building industry on a national housing project which rises above sectional interests and secondary concerns.

BOYS' CLUBS IN BRITAIN

BY LORD ABERDARE

THE growth of the boys' club movement shows clearly that the national attitude towards the welfare of youth has undergone a radical change or rather, a series of changes, within the last hundred years. From small beginnings the movement has become a vital force permeating the activities of thousands of adolescent boys, a force which gives purposeful direction to those who are about to face the tasks of adult life.

To-day, we are accustomed to hearing that youth is the golden age of opportunity, a statement which, in spite of its hackneyed use, is no mere platitude or truism. For the modern generation, and especially its younger members, the opportunities are indeed great. The raising of the school leaving age, made possible by the Education Act of 1944, the institution by many local authorities of evening classes in technical and other subjects, and the increasing number of scholarships for public schools and universities, have opened up new avenues of hope and encouragement, both in professional and industrial spheres. The provision of further education at public cost has brought to the many the privileges formerly enjoyed by the few.

As recently as the end of the eighteenth century, however, (when the first boys' clubs were fighting their early struggles to seek recognition and improve the social conditions of their members) a very different set of circumstances prevailed. The expansion of the great manufacturing cities which followed the Industrial Revolution had intensified the fight for existence among the working classes, in conditions of incredible squalor and poverty. Although the Factory Acts had alleviated some of the hardships, especially in relation to the employment of women and children, these reforms were but a drop of oil in the ocean of human misery. The slums, with their appalling filth and overcrowding, remained; so did the beer shops and "gin palaces", where the anodyne of temporary forgetfulness could be bought for a few pence. Undernourishment was the common lot of the poor, whose wages were frequently spent on alcohol—while their children, impelled by necessity, were often reduced to "scrounging" and petty pilfering. In the absence of home life and places of free amusement, boys resorted to the streets where they formed themselves into gangs under a chosen leader, and since they had no facilities for playing football they found an outlet for their high spirits in gambling and fighting.

The late Charles Russell, whose book *Lads' Clubs* has become a classic of

its kind, describes how a party of boys from one street would band themselves together and fight similar gangs from other streets with results that can be easily imagined. Occasionally, when really serious rows developed, the police had to interfere and separate the contestants. Dangerous blows were exchanged, not only with the fists but with the buckle end of a leather belt, or even with an earthenware mineral-water bottle. Russell adds that the "rougher and more unscrupulous gangs" would even vent their hooliganism on an unknown passer-by, in the absence of better sport, and it requires little imagination to envisage the dangers and consequences of such acts. If the ringleaders were caught a term of imprisonment or period in a reformatory school was likely to follow, but such measures, though instituted for the protection of society, were punitive rather than corrective. By blighting the lives of young offenders the Victorian prison and reformatory system tended to aggravate the evils which it was designed to suppress. The lack of elementary psychological understanding, both in magistrates' courts and corrective institutions resulted all too frequently in recidivism, the product of a confirmed anti-social mentality.

Among a few enlightened men there was a feeling that these evils could be lessened by providing working-class boys with premises for recreation, where an outlet could be found for natural exuberance under tolerant supervision. The aim behind most of the pioneer efforts inspired by these sentiments was admittedly of a somewhat negative and limited character, the main intention being, apparently, to keep boys off the streets. Thus the organization known as Youth Institutes began to take shape, but whether they were boys' clubs in the modern sense of the term is rather uncertain. It is quite definite, however, that the boys' club movement developed from these Institutes which, in turn, owed their origin to the Ragged Schools started in the middle of the eighteenth century by John Pounds, the crippled cobbler of Portsmouth. To the category of Ragged School workers belonged General Gordon who has often been claimed as the founder of the first boys' club. Gordon lived at Gravesend between 1865 and 1871, where he taught boys and kept a house for them; but there is no evidence to show that he founded a club, even though some aspects of his work bore a close resemblance to the activities of club-life. The first record of a genuine boys' club dates from 1872, when the Cyprus Club was established in Kennington, London; and in 1886 the late Alexander Devine started the Hulme and Chorlton-on-Medlock Lad's Club, Manchester, which was followed soon after by the formation of other clubs in the North of England and elsewhere.

Before the end of the century some of the boys' clubs in London had formed themselves into a federation, thus strengthening their influence, and in 1907 the Manchester clubs followed their example, apparently independently. Although federated in their own areas, the clubs of the one city made no endeavour to benefit by the experience of those in the other, but there was a grow-

ing feeling that some central organization should be formed to give advice and help on all matters of common interest to clubs throughout the country. In 1917, an informal meeting was held in London to discuss the problems affecting club work generally. There the matter rested for the time being, without any conclusive agreement having been reached on how the suggestions made on this occasion could be implemented. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the formation of a national organization was discussed at all, though one of the members taking part (the late Mr. F. Geoghegan, Chairman of the London Federation of Boys' Clubs) subsequently wrote in a letter that he had always regarded this meeting "as the conception" of the National Association of Boys' Clubs.

Partly because of the war, and partly due to the caution of those concerned, no constructive action was taken to form a national organization until 1924, when a Provisional Committee was set up "to prepare a scheme for assisting boys' clubs throughout the country." In due course the committee drafted a constitution which was adopted on October 24, 1925, during a conference held at Toynbee Hall, Whitechapel. On this date the National Association of Boys' Clubs can be said to have been born. A year later its membership consisted of 297 clubs, of which 253 were affiliated through local federations. To-day it has a total strength of nearly 190,000 members, belonging to 2,440 clubs; and there are over 2,500 leaders (full-time, part-time and voluntary) and 10,000 voluntary helpers. In the light of these figures it is interesting to recall the opinion of Devine, whose pioneer work has never received the recognition it deserves. In 1923 he expressed the view that clubs would not be interested in forming a national organization; they were only interested in their local federations. Fortunately, Devine's scepticism has not been justified by subsequent events.

So far, only the brief outline has been traced of the early development of the boys' club movement in this country—but what of its aims and policies? The negative purposes of the boys' clubs have already been mentioned, but after the formation of a national organization one would have expected to find a clear enunciation of its primary aims, based on positive ideas. Strangely enough no such fundamental principles appeared in print for some time. Indeed, when Mr. W. McG. Eagar suggested that they should be formulated he met with considerable opposition, but in 1929 a sub-committee of four members was appointed informally to deal with the matter. Thus the document known as *Principles and Aims of the Boys' Club Movement* came into being. Its authors stressed the necessity of providing clubs for working-class boys under wise leadership, in an atmosphere of comradeship. Moreover, they expressed the need for fitness and defined the word from the club standpoint. The "Three-fold Fitness", as it has been described, was the club ideal: spiritual fitness, moral fitness and physical fitness. Regarding club rules, it was made clear that these should be reduced to a minimum: "The real rules of a club lie in an un-

written tradition formed by the club and preserved by its members." No set rules could manufacture character, for character grew by opportunity and influence. The natural expression of boy nature, given decent guidance and adequate freedom, could produce something at least as high as anything devised by adult wisdom. Clubs were encouraged to achieve these aims through self-government and self-discipline.

Principles and Aims was accepted and adopted with enthusiasm as the policy of the movement in July 1931. The document, simple and concise, had conquered all opposition; it expressed clearly the ideals to be aimed at, while leaving the methods of their achievement mainly to the initiative and efforts of the clubs themselves. Within recent years, however, the headquarters of the National Association of Boys' Clubs has developed an intensive training system of its own, both for leaders and boys, to supplement the efforts of its affiliated federations and clubs. The latest training developments include a residential one month's course for voluntary leaders and the setting up of a mobile training wing with three instructors and a shooting brake to tour the country, giving instruction courses on the lines of the Army's flying wing. Through the generosity of Lord Joicey there are residential courses at Ford Castle, near Berwick-on-Tweed for senior boys, to fit them better for their own part in club life, and in 1945 the National Association acquired St. Pierre, a fifteenth-century manor house at Chepstow, Monmouthshire, for the training of full-time club leaders. This was made possible through a capital grant by the Carnegie Trust and by maintenance grants from the Jubilee Trust. Last year an Arts Training Centre was established at Baker's Cross in Kent, where courses on drama and handicrafts are held regularly.

Since 1933 the National Association of Boys' Clubs has followed a policy of decentralization, so that individual clubs should receive more personal attention than was possible through contact only with the central organization. This has been achieved by the formation of county associations of clubs which act as an extra link between the parent body and the local clubs. These associations now cover areas containing three-quarters of the population of the country.

The development of boys' clubs has been helped considerably since the war, through an unexpected source that originated in a prisoner-of-war camp—Oflag 79—in North Brunswick, Germany. One of the inmates of this camp stood one day, gloomily viewing his surroundings of barbed wire, when the thought struck him that his conditions were probably little worse than those under which thousands of boys in the back streets of Britain had to live. Thus the idea was born in his mind of starting a new club in Britain, and a camp committee was formed to discuss the matter. A subscription list was opened to which the prisoners themselves contributed over £13,000 and after their liberation, when the story was told to the public, a "Brunswick Appeal" was launched on a national basis to extend the original scheme, the intention being to form as many clubs as possible. Already the appeal has collected £350,000.

The future of the boys' club movement depends very largely on whether it can be equipped to take its place as a strong partner in the field of further education. Since 1939, when the Board (now the Ministry) of Education asked local education authorities to set up youth committees the State has assumed an ever-increasing responsibility for the welfare of young people. In some areas voluntary organizations were encouraged and supported by local authorities, but in other areas they set up and controlled their own recreational institutes, without showing any desire to co-operate with voluntary clubs. The Ministry, recognizing the dangers of a State-controlled uniformity and regimentation in the field of youth service, has urged the local education authorities to pursue a policy of partnership with the voluntary organizations, since (to quote its own words), "any other step would be wholly alien to the spirit of this country." The grant-aid which the Ministry has placed at the disposal of the National Association of Boys' Clubs has made possible developments which would otherwise have been impossible; there can be no doubt that the full extension of such a partnership, so that it operates between the N.A.B.C.'s county associations and the local education authorities, would do much to further the growth of boys' clubs.

Although beginning merely as a movement to make good the deficiencies in social welfare, boys' clubs have now become an accepted part of further education. There is a growing feeling that the N.A.B.C.'s work in the future will also be concerned with research and experiment, in order to discover more about the interests and aptitudes of its members. In this respect the advantages enjoyed by a voluntary organization are clear. Such a body has freedom to pursue its objectives in ways that are denied to the more rigidly controlled statutory authorities.

(Lord Aberdare is chairman of the National Association of Boys' Clubs.)

RELIGION IN EDUCATION

BY W. R. INGE

CANON LEESON rightly regards the *purpose* of education as the primary question which must determine our views on the methods of training the young.* The teacher must have some philosophy of life which he will, even though unconsciously, express in his daily work, if he is to regard his choice of a profession as a spiritual vocation. Broadly, two answers may be given as to the object of education. We may call it the full development of personality, or the preparation for citizenship. Both are true, but insufficient and even dangerous if either is taken in isolation. Personality, which is not given us to start with, is the realization of what is in us to become. The ideal object of education is that we should learn all that it concerns us to know, in order that thereby we may become all that it concerns us to be. The wise man is he who knows the relative values of things, who knows what things are best worth winning for their own sakes, and what price we must pay to win them. What are the things which, since we cannot have everything, we must be content to let go, and what are the things, which we must on no account lose? We must know ourselves, and know our world, in order to give and receive the best value for our sojourn in it. This wisdom can obviously not be won in isolation. The self-centred life has no circumference, and is maimed. The man who has no experience is made no wiser by solitude. On the other side, we cannot devote ourselves to others unless we have a self to devote. It is one of the primary truths of Christianity that all reforms must come from within, and energize outwards. The inside of the cup must be cleansed first. As Horace says, "*sincerum est nisi vas, quadcumque infundis acescit.*" There can be no good citizenship without good citizens, and we must not deify the State, which is an organization, not an organism.

The danger with us is not that we have too narrow purposes, but that we have no definite purposes at all. The Englishman, said Bishop Creighton, not only has no ideas; he hates an idea when he meets one. He has a notion that the only irreparable mistakes are made by consistent logicians. He believes in muddling through; he says to Britannia: "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever." But this vagueness is blindness to ultimate values; it is vulgarity, which Robert Bridges calls spiritual death. In practice we often fall back on unworthy aims, for example in education. The phrase 'a liberal education' perhaps sounds out of date. It means an education which is its

* *Christian Education*. The Bampton Lectures for 1944. Longmans, Green. 15s.

own end. "Of possessions," says Aristotle, "those are useful which bear fruit, those are enjoyable where nothing accrues beyond the use." Liberal education is disinterested: illiberal education is uninterested. Premature specializing and the examination system are no friends to real education. I have heard with regret that elaborate precautions are taken to prevent the pupils, and the masters, from getting hold of the papers which are to be set in public examinations.

The phrase 'climates of opinion' has now become popular. Canon Leeson quotes Lecky. There is a hidden bias of the imagination which determines in each succeeding age the realized belief. The success of an opinion depends much less upon the force of its arguments than upon the predisposition of society to receive it. Definite arguments are the symptoms and pretexts, but seldom the causes of the change. He might have added that these temporary currents of opinion are just the things which we take for granted and do not argue about, and that each generation loves to consign the household gods of its predecessor to the scrap heap. It follows that he who marries the spirit of his own age is likely to live to be a widower in the next. We old Victorians have lived through phases of nationalism, economism, and democratism. Now "we see not our tokens; there is not one prophet more"—or perhaps there are too many.

But may we not say that behind these changing winds of doctrine there are two indestructibles, two permanent acquisitions on which the whole of our civilization is based, two rivers which after their confluence have irrigated the entire mental, social and spiritual life of the European nations and their offshoots beyond the seas? These two are Christianity and Hellenism. We may call them indestructible, because we hope that our civilization is indestructible; but they are both threatened to-day as they have never been threatened before.

All educationists give a place of honour to Plato. Platonism, says Canon Leeson, is not a dead order but a living spirit, still working and kindling our spirits in an altered world of the same men. A Christian before Christ, Plato has been called; in his old age he was a Hildebrandian before Hildebrand; some would say, unfairly I think, a Nazi before Hitler. There have been three Greek revivals, says Sir Richard Livingstone, in European history. The first was when Greece lay prostrate in the ruins of its lost independence, and Rome turned to her to learn literature, thought, and civilization—unfortunately not her science. The second was in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance. But we ought to distinguish the first, the religious and Aristotelian Renaissance of the schoolmen, and the second, the Platonic, scientific, artistic and semi-Pagan Renaissance, stimulated by the recovery of Greek after the fall of Constantinople. In the earlier Renaissance the Church was for the last time in full concord with the intellectual movement of the age. This is the more remarkable when we remember that the "master of those who know" was for St. Thomas Aquinas not Plato but a more questionable ally, Aristotle. The second Renaissance was the beginning of modern history; some think that it has lasted till our own day,

and is now stricken to death. The third, Sir Richard Livingstone says, began with the opening of the nineteenth century, and, he hopes, may still continue. He points out how many of the most influential men in the nineteenth century were either good scholars or were steeped in Greek literature; Shelley, Matthew Arnold and Bridges in poetry; Gladstone, Asquith, Bryce, Cromer and Milner in politics; Mill, T. H. Green, Macaulay, Matthew Arnold and Ruskin in prose literature. We owe it to the two great traditions, Christianity and Hellenism, that the industrial revolution did not turn England into a new Carthage, all its thoughts given to industry and commerce. As it was, the faith of Plato was never forgotten. He wrote: "It is not the life of knowledge, not even if it includes all the sciences, which creates happiness and well-being, but a single branch of knowledge, the knowledge of good and evil. Without this knowledge, the use and excellence of the sciences will be found to have failed us." Prophetic words indeed.

But the Church has not welcomed the new Renaissance as it did the older one. "Nothing," says our author, "has shaken her influence for good more gravely than her flight at the approach of the new knowledge revealed in the last hundred years." Institutionalism is a fatally potent antiseptic. It preserves some gains from being lost, but it prevents many obsolete errors from being rectified.

And now very few of our young people learn Greek. It was to be expected; but the Trojan victory is in part due to the bad tactics of the Grecians. Very little was done at our public schools to encourage boys to love the Greeks and to continue their Greek studies in adult life. To read in snippets, with special attention to the 'principal parts' of verbs irregular to the verge of impropriety, was not the way to make boys love the classics. They must now be read by the majority in translations or not at all.

Our other great tradition is in no less danger. Scholars who are concerned with the purity and dignity of the English language have often pointed out how much our best writers have owed to their familiarity with the Authorized Version of the Bible, which used to be in every cottage. Who reads the Bible now? The young clergy do not, as I discovered when I was a Bishop's examining chaplain. And what do the children learn about God in school or in their homes? In most cases nothing at all.

The cause of religious teaching in the schools was ruined by the pitiful denominational squabbles in the last century. Both sides were in fault. The non-conformist ministers, irritated by social snubs and the relics of legal penalizations, hated and distrusted the established Church. The Church on its side sometimes took no advantage of its privileged position, but too often it tried to do so. Besides, the religious teaching given at the Church schools was often incredibly stupid. 'Lists of Jewish kings'; unhistorical and sometimes very unedifying chapters from the Old Testament—this is not the way to teach the Christian religion. Have we not seen the old-fashioned examination papers? "What do you know of Chedorlaomer, Jehosabassabet the Tachmonite,

Mahershalalhasbaz, Huz, Luz, and Uzzah? "

Stupidity was not the worst. The Catholic Church like other totalitarian States knows the value of getting hold of a child young. In the horrible words of Newman, the aim of education is "to pour truth into a child's mind, and to seal it up in perpetuity." This is the worst kind of abortionism, said Bernard Shaw. Castration would be a better word. We remember the answer of the Stoic, when an Epicurean asked him why an Epicurean hardly ever became a Stoic, though Stoics often became Epicureans. This policy is not often followed deliberately in the Anglican Church; but it is often hoped that the child will always be content with what he learned from "his grandmother Lois and his mother Eunice." More often, when the pupil puts away childish things, he 'throws out the baby with the bath-water' and gives up religion altogether.

Religious dogmas are not taught in the State schools. But other dogmas often are. The social position of the county school teacher is not well-defined. He or she may be the best educated person in the parish, but the school teacher is not invited to the squire's table. There is a great deal of bitter class politics in this profession, and the children soon learn it. There is a real risk of the artificial creation of an educated proletariat, always a dangerous class.

In some ways there have been changes for the better. The relations between Anglicans and Free Churchmen are far more friendly. The old 'conflict between religion and science', which was really a battle between dogmatic materialism and materialistic dogmatism, has died down. Both sides have lowered their colours. It is increasingly recognized that natural science is an abstract study, valid in its own sphere, but not a philosophy of ultimate reality, and that religious dogmas are symbolic of truths which can only be formulated in the inadequate language of space and time. Our leading thinkers are not irreligious; they are inclined to a mystical faith, which some of them hope to find not only in Christianity but in the wisdom of the East. The old-fashioned uncritical bibliolatry is now confined in low intellectual strata. But there is widespread unhappiness. The last century lost its faith in God, but kept its faith in man. Our contemporaries have lost their faith in man, a faith which is difficult to hold in face of the unexampled horrors which we have lately witnessed. A deep discouragement has followed the disappearance of what was merely a superstition, the belief in an automatic and ineluctable law of progress based on wishful thinking and a misunderstanding of evolution. The path is open for a return to religion. "When he slew them they sought him and turned them early and enquired after God." There will be a revival of religion, but not necessarily of the higher religion. Now that science has moderated its claim, there has been a lamentable recrudescence of puerile superstitions. Who could have predicted that intelligent people would come to believe in astrology and 'precognition'?

The real peril is of a breach in our traditions, affecting both the fundamental bases of our civilization. The two wars, the greatest calamity that has ever

befallen the human race, may quite possibly be the herald of a new Dark Age. The last Dark Age lasted six hundred years. I do not however think that the prospect is so black as this. War is the next abomination to go, and if war can be abolished I believe that civilization will survive. But has there ever been a time before when nothing beautiful was being made? The state of the fine arts is most discouraging.

The religious lesson in the schools is perhaps not very important. Religion is usually caught, not taught—caught from someone who has it. If the teachers are religious, that is to say if they believe that God has revealed Himself as absolute goodness or love, truth, and beauty; if they hold communion with God in prayer, and 'think on' whatever things are true, noble, just, pure and of good report, their pupils will learn essential Christianity; by seeing it in action. It ought to be possible to choose teachers of high character, and not only of intellectual competence. Did not Plato suggest that the Minister of Education should be the greatest of all the great officers of State and that "great care should be taken that the choice falls on the citizen who is in every way most suitable for the post"?* The type of Plato's Republic is laid up in heaven; but he gives the right answers to most questions. "The intelligent man," he says, 'will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness and wisdom, and will less value the others.' There is no reason why these studies should be reserved for a leisured class; but there is every reason why they should not be made more difficult either by utilitarianism or by class jealousy.

Canon Leeson's book marks a new departure in the long series of Bampton Lectures. But no one can object to the latitude which the electors have allowed for this survey of ideals and experiments in education by a distinguished headmaster of Merchant Taylors and Winchester. The Church of England has reason to regret the falling off in clerical headmasters, for in the past many of our most distinguished bishops have come from the public schools. Canterbury and Durham are now the only important sees held by ex-schoolmasters. Canon Leeson may very likely join them on the Bench.

* *Laws*, 765.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE PRESS IN THE PROVINCES

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,
Sir,

May I respectfully draw your attention to inaccuracies contained in the article "The Press in the Provinces" by Newsman in your May 1947 issue?

For instance he describes Mr. Malcolm Graham as Editor of the *Wolverhampton Express and Star*, and "a good organizer and a strong personality." May I point out that Mr. Malcolm Graham is managing director of the company owning the *Wolverhampton Express and Star*, is not, and has not at any time been, Editor of that or any other newspaper. He is Chairman of the Publicity Committee of the Newspaper Society.

I would suggest that, in referring to the South Coast resorts and the openings for additional evening papers there if and when supplies of newsprint improve, Newsman overlooked the fact that there are substantial and highly prosperous evening newspapers published at Brighton, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Bournemouth, Weymouth and Torquay, in addition to the Brighton evening paper having a well-established localized edition at Hastings.

He refers to the lifting of restrictions last September when it became possible to increase circulations, and he says that "some district journals reported forty to fifty per cent. increases." The term "district journals" is quite unknown in the newspaper industry but if, as appears to be the case from the context, your contributor intends to refer to local weekly newspapers, then he has under-estimated very considerably. Increases of up to 100 per cent. were reported in net sales by a number of weekly newspapers, and by way of tribute to those very successful publications I think it should be made quite clear that a very large proportion of the immediate sales increase of last September has been held. At the present time a number of weekly newspaper offices are producing and selling more than 100,000 copies weekly.

Without a closer knowledge of the economics and structure of the newspaper industry Newsman was bound to commit a number of errors in touching on the managerial aspect of provincial newspapers. That he is lacking in reliable information on this aspect of the industry is quite clear when he refers to any provincial or London suburban newspaper living "a precarious existence financially." That is not true of any of the papers referred to. He is also without the necessary information to express a reasonable opinion when he suggests that "if Lord Beaverbrook entered the evening newspaper field in Manchester or Liverpool the result might be the disappearance of *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Liverpool Post*" because of their reliance on the profits made by their associated evening newspapers.

Newsman has expressed opinions with regard to the production of provincial and London suburban newspapers and editors to whom newspapers appear only as "pieces of property", but that is a highly controversial rather than a factual matter. Without knowing the identity of your contributor it is not possible to say whether his opinion on these or other editorial matters would carry any weight.

It is, however, unfortunate that as he has set himself the task of looking at the press throughout the country, he should, in dealing with the Midlands and Eastern England,

have been so very perfunctory. Your contributor cannot have studied the newspapers—daily and weekly—of such places as Cambridge, Oxford, Nottingham, Leicester, to name only a few—when he wrote “the lamp burns rather low in the Midlands and Eastern England.” I write in this connection, not only as P.R.O. to the Newspaper Society, but also as a practical journalist with more than twenty years of newspaper experience.

In that dual sense I would also say that your contributor’s reference to “ingrained meanness” on the part of provincial newspaper proprietors towards their editorial staffs is quite erroneous. Your contributor may, in fact, be very much surprised to learn that responsible journalists in the provinces are to-day receiving salaries which compare very favourably with salaries for similar appointments in and around Fleet Street. Further, to suggest that “most first-rate journalists are compelled to look on provincial experience as a stepping-stone to London” is certainly not the case. There are many notable instances of Fleet Street journalists who have gone back to the provinces because they preferred to work there and because of the financial inducements to do so. It is true, of course, that a very large number of journalists migrate from the provinces to Fleet Street because—as you will know yourself—quite apart altogether from financial matters there is a fascination and a glamour about Fleet Street that draws men from all parts of the country.

If Newsman proposes to write again on this subject I trust you will be good enough to ask that he will make sure of his facts and seek that complete information that alone makes possible reasonable and accurate conclusions.

Yours faithfully,

LEONARD FLETCHER, Public Relations Officer,

The Newspaper Society.

Newsman writes:

Mr. Fletcher’s technical correction on Mr. Graham I accept. It is no more than that. Is there any doubting who is the presiding spirit and personal inspiration of the *Wolverhampton Express*? The other “inaccuracies” I challenge. I do not ‘overlook’ the existence of evening papers in Brighton and Southampton. I refer specifically to them. But Southampton, Portsmouth and Plymouth are not “resorts”, and Plymouth and Torquay are in the West.

The number of forty to fifty per cent. increases in weekly paper circulations last autumn was substantial enough to justify comment. The number of 100 per cent. increases was infinitesimal, and did not last. If Mr. Fletcher really thinks that no papers in the provinces are living precariously, he should “seek that complete information . . .” etc., which he commends to me. Has he heard about the recent purchases, by one firm, of papers in the London area? Month by month, the independents go to the wall. I wonder if Manchester would be as unconcerned at the arrival of Lord Beaverbrook as Mr. Fletcher is at the prospect.

Mr. Fletcher bids me study the papers in Nottingham and Oxford, among other towns. If he had been less “perfunctory” (his word) in his reading of my article, he would have seen that I have done that.

Finally, Mr. Fletcher shall have just a couple of examples of “ingrained meanness”. Shortly before the war, a senior reporter on a provincial paper with a national reputation was earning £7 a week. During the war the “managing editor” of a prosperous bi-weekly came to London because the N.U.J. minimum there was a distinct financial improvement for him.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

MORE BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND

By René Elvin

THE first fine, careless enthusiasm of Swiss publishers who, during and immediately after the war, appeared to be bent on replacing, with the intact but limited resources of a country of four million inhabitants, the crippled book industries of their four neighbours, seems to have waned considerably in the past few months. The reason is not far to seek, and is mainly due to the economic plight of Europe, which has grown worse instead of better during that time. Currency difficulties have restrained to a minimum the export of Swiss books to the rest of Europe and, faced with this intractable problem, many of the firms which had sprung up in Switzerland during the hostilities closed down again, while even old-established publishers had to restrict their output.

Nevertheless, a fair quantity of books of more than local interest continues to come out from the Swiss presses, which for excellence of production are still unrivalled in the world to-day. In design, typography, binding, paper, illustrations and layout, they have established a standard which even the Americans, with their unlimited resources, only achieve in their luxury editions.

What about the contents? They vary, of course, as much as in this country, but they include a far larger proportion of translations than here, American and English best-sellers being snapped up and published in German (less often in French) almost as soon as in their country of origin.

Original Swiss works of imagination are relatively few, and large-scale novels like Emanuel Stickelberger's *Künstler und König* (Huber, Frauenfeld) even rarer. This is the last work of a huge trilogy devoted to an extraordinarily incisive and acute study of King Henry VIII and his times as seen mainly from the point of view of his court painter, the German-Swiss Hans Holbein. The present volume runs to nearly 700 pages, but the interest never flags, and the reconstitution of the rough, bawdy, luxury-loving period is an amazing *tour de force*, especially for a foreigner studying documents at second hand. When more spacious conditions come again for English publishers, this is one of the works which would amply deserve the courtesy so abundantly granted to English books by Swiss firms.

A list of translated English books would serve no useful purpose, but I should like to make an exception of Pierre-Louis Matthey's *Un bouquet d'Angleterre*, (Mermod, Lausanne), an anthology of some of the best-known English poems from Shakespeare to Stevenson, in French adaptations of notable skill, elegance and charm. One phrase will have to do as example. The first line of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" becomes: *O toi toujours promise à des bras toujours clos . . .*

Uniform with that handsomely presented volume is a series including such pleasingly varied titles as Longus's *Daphnis et Chloé* (in Amyot's sixteenth-century translation), Tolstoy's *Maitre et Serviteur* (edited by the late C. F. Rumuz), and Francis Jammes's *Elégies et autres vers* (Mermod, Lausanne).

Equally heterogeneous and even more beautifully produced, the German-Swiss *Manesse Bibliothek der Weltliteratur* (Conzett & Huber, Zürich) features unaccountably neglected masterpieces of world literature, such as Turgenev's *Zapiski Okhotnika* (in German, *Aufzeichnungen eines Jägers*, in English, *Notes of a Sportsman*), and exemplary antholo-

gies such as the Italian short stories from eight centuries (*Italienische Novellen aus acht Jahrhunderten*), selected and edited by the Swiss poet and novelist Giuseppe Zoppi, or Michelangelo's poems and autobiographical writings. Another interesting title in the series is the complete edition of Grimm's Fairy Tales, whose grim ruthlessness is in startling contrast with the delightful and innocent *Biedermeier* woodcuts of Ludwig Richter and Moritz von Schwind.

Grimm's Tales seem to be favourites of Swiss publishers, and numerous editions of them have appeared lately, some of the best illustrated under the imprint of Charmer Publications, Zollikon, who have also revived with great success the old-fashioned keepsake literature, to which Goethe and Schiller did not disdain to contribute.

At the extreme opposite of these lavender-water kind of books is C. Giedion-Welcker's fascinating and extravagant *Anthologie der Abseitigen* (Benteli, Bümplitz), a collection of forgotten futuristic poems in German and French, in which painters like Picasso and the Douanier Henri Rousseau hobnob with dadaists like Tristan Tzara and Benjamin Péret, all firmly if unconsciously following the Gilbertian maxim: "The meaning does not matter, if it's only idle chatter of a transcendental kind."

Swiss writers, seldom creative in the highest sense, are often excellent and perceptive critics. One of the best of them at present, Max Rychner, has just published under the title *Zeitgenössische Literatur* (Conzett & Huber, Zürich) a series of sensitive studies of contemporary authors including Paul Valéry, Thomas Mann, André Gide and Aldous Huxley, which with their judicious blend of sober appraisal and contagious enthusiasm are among the best works of their kind to come out of Switzerland.

Political books, though less abundant than during the war, have gained interest with the publication of memoirs illuminating the tortuous manoeuvres of highly placed but timorous anti-Nazis such as the former German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, who was "purged" after the plot of July 1944 failed. His book, *Vom ändern Deutschland* (Atlantis, Zurich) proves, if it can be said to prove anything, that there was not much to choose between Hitler's *Reich* and the Germany of the aristocratic military and diplomatic clique which served him with mingled zeal and reluctance. The conclusion bears out Bismarck's considered judgment about the Germans' lack of *Zivilkourage* (civic courage), even though the conspirators paid with their lives for their ill-fated attempt to liquidate the Führer and his war.

One category of books which at one time threatened to flood the English-speaking market—hasty reminiscences of globe-trotting journalists busily buzzing from one storm-centre to another—is almost unknown in Switzerland. One exception to the rule is the shrewd and keen-sighted reporter of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Walter Bosshard, whose book *Erlebte Weltgeschichte* (Fretz & Wasmuth, Zurich), sums up five years of war coverage—with no axe to grind.

The Swiss have been for a long time pioneers in architecture and town-planning, and the publications of their best specialists in those arts cannot fail to find interested readers among their colleagues in this country. Of such is Bernoulli's *Die Stadt und ihr Boden* (Verlag für Architektur, Erlenbach), an elaborate and sometimes abstruse treatise on the fundamentals of technocracy as applied to the building of cities. His forceful logic is compellingly allied to a masterly command of all relevant facts, and should make his book "must" reading for Mr. Lewis Silkin and his associates.

Art books are outstanding in Switzerland, even among the general high standard of production there, and of those recently available in this country the splendid anthology of Spanish painting, *Spanische Malerei*, with an excellent text by Gotthard Jedlicke, and the revealing study of the early Swiss master, *Tobias Stimmer*, both offer beautiful examples and valuable works of reference.

(The first BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND article by Mr. René Elvin was published in the April 1946 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

IN DARKEST GERMANY, by Victor Gollancz. *Gollancz.* 8s. 6d.

EUROPE'S SUICIDE IN GERMANY, by Tibor Mende. *St. Botolph Publishing Co.* 6s.

Both books impressively illustrate the gigantic tragedy which the treatment of defeated Germany is preparing not only for Germany herself but for the world.

Mr. Gollancz's book is mainly a 'documentary'. A series of letters written from the autumn of 1946, together with 144 photographs, show conditions in the bigger towns of the British zone of Germany. This qualification is important. In a condition of growing chaos and collapse of economic controls one of the worst features is the increasing gulf between town and country. In the bigger towns and industrial centres of the West, the food, housing and work position is rapidly assuming the proportions of one of the major catastrophes of modern times. In many parts of the country, on the other hand, the standard of living is substantially unaltered. Farmers and, of course, anyone who has something to offer, whether cigars, nails, grease, cuts down deliveries as the controls slacken, and he acquires what he wants through direct barter.

Mr. Gollancz has been one of the first and the most persistent opponents of the economic but in particular the ethical perversion which dominated the Allied approach to German problems immediately after the war, and the letters reprinted in this book show again the clarity and firmness of his conviction that the treatment of Germany according to standards preached by the Nazis is not only bad ethics, but also poor policy. Beyond the re-statement of this belief, and some first hand evidence on health and nutrition standards, the book is not, and does not claim to be a contribution to the incredibly complex problem of Allied Military Government in Germany.

Mr. Mende's little book is a very interesting and illuminating contribution to some aspects of the German problem. The

author's thesis is obvious from the title. He gives a brief but accurate survey of the comparative psychology of the four zones including an estimate—which I believe to be correct—that the Russians have a fair chance of winning substantial support in their zone, as the memory of their first period of retaliation fades and the situation in the West deteriorates. I strongly agree with the critical observations on the seclusion of the British and American personnel, by comparison with the Russians.

The author also correctly notes dangerous signs of social reaction in the West, and the superficiality of the feeling of guilt of Germans (matters have not been made any easier by the disastrous policy of treating all Germans as equally guilty). He favours a definite socialist policy as the only means of preventing a revival of the worst forms of German militarism and reaction, a closer collaboration between Socialists and Communists, and a renewed attempt at "functional" collaboration of the Allies, in such matters as international control of the Ruhr, and the European integration of other German activities. Unfortunately, the prospects for such a development have further deteriorated since the book was written, and there is now a definite danger that an eventual recovery of Germany may result from one of the worst possible causes: an increasing tension between West and East, and the consequent reactivation of the respective parts of Germany as part of a general strategic concept.

W. FRIEDMANN.

THE CHANGING SCENE IN CHINA, by Gilbert Baker. *Student Christian Movement Press.* 6s.

During the Japanese invasion of China Kunning, capital of the remote south-western province of Yunnan, became the refuge (for many a "stony-hearted step-mother") of Chinese from all points of the compass; professors and students striving against incredible poverty to rebuild the universities which the Japanese

had destroyed in east and north; wealthy families paralysed by the ruin of their world in Hong Kong and Shanghai; terrified fugitives from Burma; and for all alike the hardships of life immeasurably aggravated by the rapidly depreciating currency. Mr. Gilbert Baker lived through all this and his admirable and beautifully written book presents an intensely graphic picture of various characteristic types — professors, students, young men and women in the new relationships produced by war and the loss of their families, soldiers and officials.

Mr. Baker writes always as a missionary, to show what Christianity has done and can do for China. But even those who are not particularly concerned in missions will find his book of absorbing interest. A better presentation of modern China and the peculiar difficulties with which the transition from "old custom" confronts her one cannot recall.

The best chapter, and the most important since it deals with the big class on whom China's future must be built, is that devoted to the student. Lonely at heart, eager for action, but neglected, seeing no outlet and floating in a mental void without moral anchorage, the student too often has no hope but to get abroad where perhaps he may find a cure for his troubles. Both in its refusal to send students into the army till the war was virtually over and its attempts to put the students in a fascist strait waistcoat, the Government's handling of these young men has been singularly inept. The picture of the professors is altogether delightful. From a missionary point of view Mr. Baker's well-timed admonition: "These scholars will not be won by contempt for learning—by ill-educated advisers," recalls what the Jesuits knew three centuries ago.

The coming of the American troops, their boisterous though generous ways and their prodigal wealth upheaved all Yunnan. "We must remember," said one professor gently, "that all the Americans are not very well educated."

Mr. Baker shrewdly observes that the overwhelming strength of the Allies deepened the Chinese sense of their inferiority in modern warfare and intensified the violent, thorny self-assertiveness which at present prevents China from accepting the help she needs. But there are those, as Mr. Baker shows, in whom the humiliating contrasts between Chinese and foreign standards of efficiency have developed a power of self-criticism which gives hope for China's future.

O. M. GREEN.

THIS HOUSE AGAINST THIS HOUSE, by Vincent Sheean. *Macmillan*. 16s.

If you scratch a good American you might well expect to find a good European. The casual mixture of the leading races of Western man, at a sufficient distance away from Europe, ought to provide the educated citizen of the States with the best possible vantage point from which to observe European affairs. The benevolent ignorance of Woodrow Wilson, however, followed by twenty years of isolation, had taught us by 1940 that things did not often work out that way. Yet now we know again that unless the leaders of American thought can understand and successfully influence European affairs, there is little chance of peace in our time. Perforce we have come back to hoping that America will learn. The appearance of *This House Against This House*, and the interest it has aroused on both sides of the Atlantic, are hopeful straws in the wind.

Vincent Sheean's latest work (it follows *Between the Thunder and the Sea*) is curiously built. Part I contains a study of the Treaty of Versailles, a record of the shifting American attitude towards the League and a comparison between Europe in 1919 and Europe now. Part III contains the thought of Part I. But in the centre of the book are, rather surprisingly, 240 pages of war reporting. They have all the power and polish of high-grade New York journalism. They have also

its brief topicality and therefore they are now dead. They can reasonably be omitted. The rest of the book is more than sufficient justification for its appearance.

The essence of Mr. Sheean's thought is contained in his quotation from Richard II:

O, if you raise this house against this house
It will the woofullest division prove
That ever fell upon this cursed earth.
Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so,
Lest child, child's children, cry against you
'woe'!

The problem is the familiar one, that from which few educated minds, waking or sleeping, can long remain free, the problem of whether we can avoid another war. The freedom to struggle for freedom is, writes Mr. Sheean, "*unconscious* in the collective mind of the West." It expresses itself "not by dialectical proliferation, as other ideas do, but by the ordinary acts of life in which Western man *behaves* like a free man, says and does what he likes or protests against any restraint upon his right to do so." What Western man understands by freedom is, in Mr. Sheean's view, not at all what Russians understand by it (in our sense there is no freedom in Russia) but this should not blind us to the fact that the direction of the Russians' effort, in spite of the vast disparity in methods, is the same as our own. They pursue the greatest good of the greatest number. And yet "the single man could be happy in the aboriginal forest, as he was in Periclean Athens or the Renaissance, and as he may be to-day; but social man, man in society, courts disaster at a rate so vertiginous that his annihilation now becomes a matter of where next he plants his reckless step or how much he can learn to think in a few years of grace."

The author offers no solution and indeed no easy hope. But his analysis is brilliant. It is a real contribution to what we have to learn in these few years of grace.

GORDON WINTER.

THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY,

by Ernest William Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham. *Longmans*. 15s.

Not since the days of the late George Tyrrell has so direct and forthright a challenge to the conventional interpretation of the Christian faith issued from out of the bosom of the Church as the Bishop of Birmingham's study of the origins of Christianity, and, now as then, it is likely to arouse strong, not to say fierce and bitter denunciation on the part of those to whom that historic interpretation is sacrosanct. No cry of 'Modernism'—that word which frightens only theological old women of both sexes—will, however, be an adequate answer, for the volume calls for "straight" thinking free from all theological prejudice.

Dr. Barnes seeks through his outline of the history of the first 300 years of Christianity to disentangle therein the essential and original truth from what he believes are secondary and irrelevant accretions. The upshot of that examination is his conviction that an original core of ethical idealism based on the revelation by Jesus Christ of a God Who is Love, was overlaid, hidden and distorted by apostles and evangelists who lived in a world in which mystery religions were all important, and who, to a greater or less extent, shared in the prevailing superstitions of their time. The original faith as preached by the Founder of Christianity was reasonable and ethical, and setting, as it did, the highest possible value on human personality, it made an irresistible appeal to the proletariat of the first and the immediately succeeding centuries. In the combination of these two facts Dr. Barnes finds the secret of the rise of Christianity.

He arrives at this position by an examination of the relevant documents stretching all the way from the earlier letters of St. Paul to the writings of the early fathers of the Church, so including the Gospels themselves, and in the course of which, it is fair to say, the more radical school of New Testament scholars is taken, some-

what uncritically, to be the more accurate. Dr. Barnes has threaded his way through them with very great skill, and, for the size of the volume, with commendable fullness. Of the honesty of that examination, and of Dr. Barnes's belief that thereby he has succeeded in giving us a version of Christianity which the modern man can accept, there can be no question.

This is the work of a thinker for whom truth is all, and who feels compelled at the end to use the blue pencil freely, not only on the ancient creeds of Christendom, but on the Gospels themselves. Miracles are unthinkable because they conflict with our modern conception of the uniformity of natural law; neither of the two great dominical sacraments of baptism or eucharist means what a plain reading of the Gospels would seem to say, and the story of the Virgin Birth is a mythological transcript from the mystery religions.

Now that insistence on ethical religion is all to the good, especially in these days when the flight from reason seems to be in full swing in at least some important schools of current theological thinking and we are being asked to accept authoritative tradition, whether of the Catholic or the Protestant type, in place of reason. It is an entirely different thing, however, to say that the story of the rise of Christianity can be expressed in Dr. Barnes's simple formula, and that that explanation adequately covers all the facts. Two things have to be said, and the first is, that if it be true, then the survival of Christianity becomes more of a riddle than ever.

The puzzle can be put in a single question: "If noble moral idealism be the full answer, why was it that Judaism and Stoicism ceased to be ethically creative whilst Christianity survived to be a creative force in the world's history for the best part of 1,800 years?" That question leads directly into the second observation, that the explanation does not account for the plain facts. Banish every miracle if you will, and eliminate every trace of the possible influence of the mystery religions



Scotland

Edited by
H. W. MEIKLE,
C.B.E., D.LITT.

*H.M. Historiographer
Royal for Scotland*

Presents a complete picture
of every aspect of Scottish
life, history, literature and art,
*With colour plates and half-
tone illustrations* 15s. net

Horabin's Atlas-History of the Second Great War

Volume 10, completing J. F.
Horabin's record of the
war on all fronts. 5s. net

Citizens All

M. W. THOMAS

A brief survey of the elements
of national and local govern-
ment, of Commonwealth and
Empire government and of
UNO. *Illustrated.* 15s. net

Man and Temple

RAPHAEL PATAI
Ph.D., F.R.A.I.

A study of anthropology in
respect of the rise of primitive
myth and its crystallization
in religious ritual. 8s. 6d. net

History of the Salvation Army

COLONEL R. SANDALL

Volume I (1865-78) of this au-
thoritative history which will
be issued at the rate of one
volume every two years.
Illustrated. 10s. 6d. net

NELSON

on Gospels and Epistles, one obstinate fact still remains. Cut the New Testament and Gospels where you will, and they bleed with the steady and unvarying conviction that not only have the early Christians seen new ideals, they have laid hold of a new power, not their own, to realize them. That was the factor *par excellence* which differentiated Christianity alike from Stoicism and Judaism; it was this factor, found to be true in actual human experience, which accounts for the survival of Christianity, and it is precisely this difference between the mystery religions, Stoicism and Judaism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, with which Dr. Barnes does not deal. The result is that, for all its honesty and courage, this book is very much Hamlet without the Prince, and we suspect that it is so because Dr. Barnes has seen as mainly a problem of ideas what is in fact primarily a transaction in the realm of the human spirit.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

THE HOUSE OF ORANGE, by Marion E. Grew. *Methuen*. 16s.

Morally if not legally, the purchaser of this book might have some claim to have his money returned, not because of its faults but because of its misleading title. The House of Orange means to most people the House of Orange-Nassau, the family from which our William III derived. An admirably heraldic dust-cover adds to the book's outward promise, encouraging the reader to expect an account of that family and a solution perhaps of the problems which still surround it. But the late Mrs. Grew was interested in William the Silent and his descendants only in their (very incidental) capacity as rulers of Orange itself. Her book is about that principality in relation to its successive—and mostly absentee—dynasties, and also in relation to the rest of Europe. As such it can be highly recommended. The misfortune is that so much industry should have been lavished on a subject so narrow in scope.

The Principality of Orange had ad-

mitedly a certain importance. It lay in that borderland which might adhere either to France or to the Empire, and it retained its shaky independence until as late as 1703. It was a bargaining counter for diplomatists and a refuge for oppressed minorities. Its flag appeared on battlefields and gave to privateers an air of strict legality. Placed but a little further eastwards, Orange might have retained to this day the sort of national identity accorded to Andorra or Liechtenstein. It might even now draw its revenues from the world's philatelists. But fate or Louis XIV willed it otherwise and the story of its dynasties lacks the interest of a picturesque survival.

As for Orange itself, the town, the fortress, the former boundaries, its history might be worth the telling. That is not, however, what the authoress chose to do. Omitting to explain where Orange is, and as reticent about its military or economic value, she wrote mainly of its religious dissensions. Certain weaknesses in the book—the lack of map, plan or bibliography and the inadequacy of the index—are the result, no doubt, of the authoress dying before her work was in proof. But its faults are mainly inherent in its theme.

Despite these limitations, this is in some ways a remarkable book—or the work, at least, of a remarkable woman. The product, as her style reminds us, of Victorian Oxford, she spent an active and useful life as teacher, as organizer of the Women's Trade Union League, and finally as a wife. She was well over sixty when she reverted to her earlier historical interests, aroused by Sir John Marriott and dating back to the time of Jowett, Mark Pattison and Mrs. Humphry Ward. She was sixty-nine when she undertook the researches on which this book was based and if this argues no ordinary degree of resolution, it is still more astonishing that she should have brought them to a triumphant conclusion seven years later, during the dark days of 1942. Given such a background, such a combination of age and inexperience, the



THE PLEASURE GROUND

Edited by

MALCOLM ELWIN

Original stories, prose and poetry by contemporary writers. "The miscellany is as miscellaneous as could be desired . . . the list of authors who contribute to it is catholic."—ROBERT LYND (*Observer*).

Illustrated.

8s. 6d.

MACDONALD

authoress who could write as well as she did must indeed have been a gifted and courageous woman. Within the bounds she set herself, she did her work with patience and skill, fitting the story of Orange into its diplomatic framework and showing much knowledge of the periods described. Whether this exact task was worth doing may be doubtful. But the wonder remains that it was done at all.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

MORE LEGAL FICTIONS, by A. Lawrence Polak. Illustrated by Diana Pullinger. *Stevens*. 6s.

In his previous volume of *Legal Fictions* Mr. Polak drew stories from classical mythology and founded upon them a number of imaginary law suits; their humour and the faithfulness of the legal language employed drew praise from the discerning and left an appetite for more. This the author has sought to feed with a similar volume based on Shakes-

peare, and he has repeated his earlier success. The book is pleasantly illustrated by Diana Pullinger.

Mr. Polak defends his impertinences entertainingly by the citation of Shakespeare's own unflattering opinion of lawyers in general, evidenced by quotations of many passages from the plays, and thus enters the (admittedly unrecognized) plea of 'Tu quoque'. Following this introduction come ten cases of which the first (*Attorney-General v. Albany—King Lear*) and the last (*Shylock v. Antonio—Merchant of Venice*) appear the best. The handling of the various judgments is cleverly done; each has the authentic ring, though it is not possible to feel that the case chosen is itself always equally convincing; the sub-poena of the ghost in *Hamlet* proved an irresistible attraction, but the final points in the summing up of this case are handled rather too summarily to give entire satisfaction.

On the other hand the judgment con-

cerning Lear's maintenance by his daughters is a brilliant exposition, and in every case the transition to modern courts of law is excellently conceived.

Mr. Polak has set himself a difficult task, since in so far as his readers' amusement depends on some knowledge of the law there is a risk that what may entertain lawyers may be above the heads of laymen. It could not be denied that the professional should derive a richer enjoyment from his examination of the cases on legal grounds than the general reader can expect to find, but all of us are sufficiently familiar with legal intricacies and jargon to appreciate the major part of the author's subtleties. Judgment (with costs) to Mr. Polak.

J. F. BURNET.

THE LOST TREASURES OF LONDON, by William Kent. *Phoenix House*. 12s. 6d.

It is a long time since a workman searching in the ruins of St. Paul's Cathedral after the Great Fire of 1666 for something on which to cut a mason's mark, for incorporation in the new building, casually selected a piece of gravestone on which was inscribed a single word: *Resurgam*.

But from the days of Boadicea succeeding generations of Londoners have been no strangers to the destruction of their city by fire, though the year 1666 still vies with 1066 as one of the two dates that the most ignorant of its citizens remember. The great funeral pyre of the Middle Ages reduced much of London to ashes in five days, leaving so little for us to treasure and protect.

The bombing of Barcelona and the destruction of Guernica had already raised grave apprehensions in the minds of all London lovers. We knew that the 'military objectives' of the docks here were but a stone's throw from some of our priceless possessions. This book recalls for the Londoner the grim days and nights when the whine and crash of bombs left the city scarred and broken. Over the wounds and gaps the flowering weeds now soften

the tragedy; human minds accept the new outline and forget the beauty that has gone for ever.

The author in the tradition of John Stow seeks to draw up a balance sheet of the losses London suffered during the blitz years, and conveys the items of his bookkeeping during the course of a series of 'walks' which he invites his readers to share. For their guidance he includes a set of maps showing the main thoroughfares and principal buildings. Much we had forgotten, if indeed we ever knew, and the full measure of our loss is made obvious. Happily there is a credit side revealed by him of what remains to us.

The book is well illustrated and contains a chapter devoted to the damage sustained by historical buildings in Greater London. It is a fitting epilogue to this skilled chronicler's *An Encyclopaedia of London*.

One notes with regret the lack of reference to the destruction of domestic architecture of the Georgian period. Perhaps in a future volume this omission may be rectified and the author may be prevailed upon at the same time to give us his views on the various plans now in existence for the rebuilding of London.

HERBERT T. BANYARD.

CHINESE POEMS. Translated by Arthur Waley. *Allen & Unwin*. 8s. 6d.

DECEMBER SPRING, by Jocelyn Brooke. *John Lane, The Bodley Head*. 6s.

One of the tests of a cultured mind might be, perhaps, the degree of importance which it attaches to the present, the purely contemporary, against what endures from the timelessness of the past. Chinese poets were nothing if not cultured; and though their balanced poems, reflecting moods of resignation, were taken from their day to day life, the subjects themselves nearly always transcended the contemporary interest and had a wider, universal appeal. Above all, the Chinese poet was a master of evocation, of suggestion.

Here in one volume are nearly all Arthur Waley's justly famous translations of Chinese poetry, revised and with additional notes, and with a few new translations added. The poems are from "170 Chinese Poems" (1918), "More Translations" (1919), "The Temple" (1923), and "The Book of Songs" (1937). There are many more translations of the poems of Po-chu-i than of any other poet because, as Mr. Waley explains: "I find him by far the most translatable of the major Chinese poets." He asserts that he is not unfamiliar with the works of the other great T'ang and Sung poets, but modestly disclaims success in his attempts to translate Li Po, Tu Fu and Su Shih. I think it is a great pity, however, that Mr. Waley has not reprinted his Introduction to "170 Chinese Poems" as a Preface to this collection, for it is excellent and helps to prepare the mind of the reader for the right approach to Chinese poetry when this is wanted. He shows us that Chinese poetry is gently reflective rather than forcefully dynamic: "Our poets imagine themselves very much as Art has portrayed them—bare-headed and wild-eyed, with shirts unbuttoned at the neck as though they feared that a seizure of emotion might at any minute suffocate them. The Chinese poet introduces himself as a timid recluse . . . a neat and tranquil figure compared with our lurid frontispieces." Such reflective nature poetry—often poems of regret and parting—Arthur Waley's unrhymed, rhythmical verse seems successfully to transmit.

It is difficult to quote from so many poems, from so much quiet beauty; but in one instance, from Po-chu-i, one is reminded of Wordsworth's "I wandered lonely as a cloud".

December Spring is in some ways an exasperating book, for it has merit, yet such defects! A part of it belongs to the know-all, believe-nothing generation of a too slick cleverness, but the war experience of the author must excuse much bit-

terness. It strives hard in places to be appropriately sophisticated, dreadfully contemporary, and succeeds in being prosy:

Easy, we thought, to escape
From the matey wirecracks and the pin-up
girls,
The *Blighy* jokes, the jam-session, the slick
False-dentured, brylcreem culture: easy to
bend
The will from the nude and hard compulsion
of

The athletic Death:

with an inverted left-wing snobbery of phrases such as "the posh Edwardian town" which are merely tiresome. But Mr. Brooke is a well-known botanist, as well as having been a serving soldier; and his detailed knowledge of flower and myth often produces good nature poetry:

April came up from the South, with lily and
tulip
Spring in the young wheat, and the cyclamens
Darting their tongues of dusky and crimson
fire
Suddenly sunward from the Plutonic dark,
Heralding May-time and the precocious
summer,
The rose-hung hedges, the harvest over in
June.

There is one poem, however, which seems worth most of the rest. It is called "Lament". Here a moving sincerity of emotion conquers all tricks of an experimental diction, as may be seen from the last stanza:

I have seen the sharp-toothed vampire
Hanging beneath the eaves;
I have heard the dawn-wind singing
And the night-wind which grieves
For the children with hair like flowers,
And the loud bells ringing
In tall tree-haunted towers
Now broken and fallen apart;
There is death in the wind's singing—
The soldiers have eaten my heart.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

DELICIOUS VINTAGE
CIDER AND PERRY
SUPPLIED IN RETURNABLE 6, 10 & 15 GALLON CASKS
IMMEDIATE DELIVERY WHILE STOCKS LAST
WRITE FOR PRICE LIST
The Cotswold Cider Company
NEWENT, GLOUCESTERSHIRE

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

INDIA, almost for the first time in its history, has become regular front page news even in the more popular 'dailies'. The British public, conscious of its ignorance, comments cautiously, perhaps realizing that the ease with which they compromise is not given to those whose political beliefs are linked inseparably to religious faith. Even now it is not too late to benefit from an understanding of the background and a student could hardly do better than to make his start with *THE BRITISH IN INDIA* by P. J. Griffiths (*Robert Hale*. 10s. 6d.) Mr. Griffiths's book is remarkably objective and easy to read. A man of great experience—fifteen years a member of the I.C.S., a magistrate in the Mindanapore district and leader of the European Group in the Indian Legislative Assembly—he answers elementary questions with admirable clarity and leaves us not only with the feeling of knowledge but of understanding. To quote one sentence: "To the Moslem, a determined individualism and the belief in equality are natural—to the Hindu they are unnatural."

The glance backwards

Of India, in his selected speeches, *PURPOSE AND POLICY* (*Hutchinson*. 12s. 6d.), the Prime Minister has a little to say in a broadcast talk on Government proposals given on September 19, 1945. Political speeches seldom read well a year or so after the event but Mr. Attlee comes out handsomely from this glance backwards. His powers of oratory are slender, yet his quiet dignity and sincerity, allied to conviction and a pleasing pedestrianism are effective. The reply to Mr. Churchill's first election broadcast reads effectually and it is easy to discern from it where Mr. Attlee's strength lies. Not a great war leader, perhaps, or the man for the moment of emotion, but truly a man of peace. Since Lord Aberdare is writing in this issue, I turned particularly to see what Mr. Attlee had to say when

he spoke at a luncheon of the National Association of Boys' Clubs. Himself a former club manager in the East End and with a memory of boys' clubs going back forty years, the Prime Minister was on familiar ground. He said: "Everything really rests on personality rather than on set rules." He meant, I imagine, personality in the sense of example, a key to his own character.

Noble words

There is nobility about another book of recaptured words, written for the moment as leading articles in *The Manchester Guardian* and now reprinted under the title *FAITH IN FRANCE* (*John Sherrat & Son, Manchester*. 10s. 6d.) Professor D. W. Brogan writes a Preface and claims justly that these articles on French themes were "the sanest, best-informed, most generous and so most wise lead given to British public opinion . . ." The same sturdy spirit of unconquerable faith was not shared by all of us in those black years 1940-1944; it may not be shared now. For who can echo in the words of the final leader, "France enjoys to-day advantages greater than she has enjoyed at any time since the Revolution, for at this moment (September, 1944) the ideas of that Revolution are a greater force for unity than they have been since 1789"? Old values are being challenged and denied, yet these leaders bring balm to troubled minds, expressing finely what many men still wish to believe.

Is it the last?

A man who stood for most things which *The Manchester Guardian* so resolutely stands against has in death become the subject of a best-seller. *THE LAST DAYS OF HITLER* by H. R. Trevor-Roper (*Macmillan*. 10s. 6d.) has taken the town by storm by virtue, I think, of its author's narrative style. It is a brilliantly told story, as exciting and compelling as

the best of detective tales and truly astonishing when we reflect that it is the result not of imagination but of careful research. But has Mr. Trevor-Roper destroyed the Hitler legend? I think not, nor do I think that his estimate of Himmler, and perhaps of others, will be final. We have not heard the last of them by a long chalk and about Hitler we shall be fated to read and read.

What happened in Hitler's bunker in Berlin has had to be reconstructed; what happened at Nuremberg is known. It has been put on record for us in convenient form by R. W. Cooper of *The Times* in *THE NUREMBERG TRIAL* (Penguin Books. 1s.). This is an excellent summary and, at the present time, about as much as most men will wish to stomach of this revelation of man's calculated cruelty to man. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's foreword takes the reader into the controversial arena of the wisdom of such trials. Those who have read Mr. F. Elwyn Jones's comments in this issue on the guilt of generals will find this foreword an interesting corollary.

Another character, who has played a part in the wings of the same stage, is Haj Amin El Hussein better known to us as the Mufti. His story is related for us in *MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* by Maurice Pearlman (Victor Gollancz. 6s.). The activities of the Mufti have not been favourable to this country. He is a man, as Lord Harlech once said, "of quite unlimited political ambitions"; yet the plea of Mr. Pearlman, to bring Haj Amin to book, is not necessarily the best advice to follow.

A long association

To turn to more pleasant matters and to make a start with a stalwart friend of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Sir John Marriott. Sir John wrote for this journal over a span of more than forty years. His first article was in 1900, an appreciation of his friend Sir W. W. Hunter; his last, "The Problem of Central Europe" in April, 1945, two months before his death. *THE FORTNIGHTLY* honoured him much and,

in his closing years, perhaps particularly as a reviewer whose age and experience helped him to discover the originality in a book and to praise it where praise was due. On his subjects he knew what had been written over the past sixty years and his own library was wonderfully complete. But he was away from his books when he wrote his autobiography *MEMORIES OF FOUR SCORE YEARS* (Blackie & Son. 12s. 6d.) and it does not do him justice. Sir John had a full life and, right up to the end, in letters, reviews and articles maintained his interest in current affairs—or, as he would say, politics. The autobiography reflects these interests as a mirror without depth. Those who moved in the same social world as Sir John, with like memories, will enjoy his stories but to those of a younger generation there must be regret that so little of real worth is told of such important matters, for example, as the early days of the Oxford University Extension Delegation to which Sir John succeeded as secretary in 1895.

Educating ourselves

If the reader is one of those to whom the State educational system of the country, and particularly the changes since the Education Act, 1944, are barely comprehended he could hardly do better—assuming that for him a large book on education is out of the question—than to read *EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY* by John L. Hardie (Art & Educational Publishers. 2s. 6d.). Mr. Hardie has caught the spirit of the Act, and with a few good pictures to help him, is able to impart his knowledge in a friendly way. So small a volume must have many omissions; Mr. Hardie makes up for them with an extraordinarily well-selected book list for the reader, if inclined. In the same series, which are called "The New Era Books", also published at half-a-crown, is *LEARNING TO LIVE* by Ross D. Waller, almost as useful, but not I think quite, on adult education.

Ronald Rubinstein in *JOHN CITIZEN AND THE LAW*, a double *Pelican*, (Penguin

Books. 2s.) offers education of another sort. Disarmingly, he dedicates his book in particular to his wife, and in general to all those who conscientiously read and digest the Preface before they begin on Chapter 1. He thus ensures that his reader gets the necessary warning that no one must take the author's generalizations as applicable to the facts of his particular case. A good book this and one which really does succeed in its object of making clear the "rules and regulations" by which we are governed.

Distinctive stories

Occasionally we are made aware of an author, as if for the first time, in spite of a passing acquaintance with his or her work for a number of years. Such was my experience on reading *FIRST LOVE AND OTHER STORIES* by Viola Meynell (*Jonathan Cape. 9s.*). Viola Meynell's stories are not completely satisfying. She seems to stand aloof from her characters as if propinquity might mar or break their outlines; yet the writing is delicate and distinguished, the observations acute and the emotions real. Perhaps we may see her achievements and her present failings in the longest story in this book, "Pastoral". Stripped down it is the story of a girl who marries, in a moment of despair, the wrong man George, a farmer who adores her. She recovers her will to live, agrees to run away with Alistair, the man she really loves and then finds she cannot. This is very nearly a magnificent story. It falters at the scene between Marie and Alistair and thereafter the tension does not heighten as it should. The climax, long anticipated by the reader, is in fact anti-climax. Miss Meynell's art is fragile; one false step and the illusion of sharing an emotional experience is broken. It is a penalty of aiming high, yet Miss Meynell is right to do so for the quality of her work commands admiration even if she has yet to write the perfect story.

Mr. Eric Allen's work contrasts strongly

with that of Miss Meynell. His *BROADCAST STORIES* (*Rich & Cowan. 9s. 6d.*) come into the category of yarns. Unhappily the time-space demand of the B.B.C. becomes aggravating when it is translated into thirty-one consecutive stories in a book. Obviously writing stories for this medium ceases to be an art and becomes a journalistic feat. Mr. Allen is a competent performer.

Is Lear immortal for his nonsense rhymes? It is not for my generation to decide, brought up as I was to sing "The Owl and the Pussy-cat" with my head just above the key-board of the piano-forte and no knowledge at all of the man, Lear. Yet, surely, there will be few who can deny his charm now displayed in modern omnibus form in *THE COMPLETE NONSENSE OF EDWARD LEAR* edited and introduced by Holbrook Jackson (*Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.*). Mr. Holbrook Jackson refers to his "invincible boyishness", a grand phrase, but what other boy has ever thought of such a rhyme as 'dumbs' to follow 'thumbs' in that glorious self-portrait

He has ears, and two eyes, and ten fingers,

Leastways if you reckon two thumbs;

Long ago he was one of the singers,

But now he is one of the dumbs.

Or such ludicrous pictures and titles for his nonsense botany?

A miscellany

The three miscellanies which preceded the *DAILY TELEGRAPH FOURTH MISCELLANY*, compiled by Campbell Dixon (*Hutchinson. 6s.*) did not come my way, so I cannot compare them or define the exact purpose of the series. The result is pleasant enough and anyone who enjoys the handy book for the pocket which talks about such things as wine, letters, cricket, and gardens will find this selection a happy one.

My colleague, Grace Banyard, is on holiday which is why "Books on the Table", for this month only, is signed

JOHN ARMITAGE.